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THE AB5 EXPERIMENT - SHOULD
STATES ADOPT CALIFORNIA'S
WORKER CLASSIFICATION LAW?
SAMANTHA J. PRINCE*

A worker's classification as either independent contractor or
employee drives whether a worker is entitled to minimum wage, overtime,
worker's
compensation,
unemployment
compensation,
antidiscrimination protection, National Labor Relations Act protections, and
many other safety-net protections. During the COVID-19 pandemic,
unemployment protections were extended to independent contractors, but
this is not the norm and is not slated to continue post-pandemic.
Classifying certain workers, particularly those who work in the appbased economy, is challenging, so states are looking for an answer either through their own innovation or through that of other states.
California's answer was AB5.
AB5 's goals were to correct misclassification issues for app-based
drivers and other workers. A plethora of workers including court
reporters, freelance writers and photographers, coaches, truckers,
performing artists (mimes, magicians, comedians, etc.), and musicians
rebuked AB5. AB5 is well known beyond California's borders as it
received, and continues to receive, nationwide attention predominantly
because it reclassified app-based drivers (such as Uber, Lyft, DoorDash,
etc.) as employees.
As Justice Brandeis said, one of the benefits of federalism is that
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states can act as "laboratories of democracy." Experimental federalism
can provide for collective learning across the states if they are all
experimenting, but often states look to one another for innovative
solutions so that they can free-ride instead of experiment. Some states
that are looking for an improved worker classification law seek to learn
from, and potentially free-ride on, California's AB5 "experiment. " In
considering whether to adopt AB5 or a similar statute, states should
consider, at a minimum, three factors: relevancy ofthe law to their state,
ease in obtaining information about the law, and the costs to adopt,
implement, and enforce the law. This Article assists policymakers and
interest groups by providing a detailed look at the AB5 experiment. It
applies the aforementioned three factors and determines that
California's law, while well-intentioned is likely not valuable for, or
adoptable by, other states or the federal government partly because it
contains 109 exemptions.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that to maximize the benefits of
experimental federalism, a group of states, both homogenous and
heterogenous to California, should experiment with more novel
approaches to reach an optimal solution to worker (mis)classification.
Adopting California's worker classification law will result in states
following a sub-optimal law and in premature convergence delaying
states from reaching a better solution. Workers need protections, but
California's worker classification law does not sufficiently satisfy this
need. Further experimentation is required.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Among the potential benefits of American federalism is the ability of
states to serve as policy laboratories, adopting novel policies to address
their needs, abandoning unsuccessful attempts, and learning from the
success of similar states. " 1

State policymakers are like scientists. Scientists see a problem and seek
to create a solution. Policymakers see a problem and seek to create a solution,
too. Both experiment in isolation - scientists in a physical laboratory;
policymakers within their borders. "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country." 2
Both scientists and policymakers provide the results of their experiments
so that others can learn from them. States in which policymakers create
novel policies to address problems serve as policy laboratories - they
experiment. A goal of experimental federalism is to reach an optimal policy
through multiple states experimenting. When legislative experiments are
successful, other policymakers will be more prone to adopt (or free-ride on)
the legislation being tested.3 But if free-riding occurs before an optimal
solution is reached, then the result is premature convergence - getting stuck
in using a sub-optimal statute. Additionally, if policymakers adopt a statute

1. Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories:
Emulating Success in the
Children's Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. Ser. 294, 294 (2006).
2. Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis is well known for this quote from his lengthy
dissenting opinion in a case about a law Oklahoma created to regulate the sale of ice.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. Volden, supra note 1, at 294.
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without considering the experiment's results, the benefit of experimenting
within that closed universe of a particular state is untapped.
California has long been regarded as one of the most legally innovative
states. 4 And California serves as a "first-mover" when tackling many salient
issues such as environmental, social, and data privacy policies.
In 2019, California policymakers set out to solve another problem - the
wage and labor inequities that California app-based workers and others face
when their statuses are misclassified as independent contractors. 5 Workers
classified as "independent contractors" suffer a lack of minimum wage and
overtime pay, and the absence of safety-net protections like workers'
compensation and unemployment insurance. 6 As a solution, the California
legislature enacted Assembly Bill S, known as ABS.7 And so the experiment
began.
This Article begins by walking you through the ABS experiment and
California workers' reaction to ABS. It then outlines the results thus far and
the next phase in the experiment. It concludes by describing how state
policymakers can utilize the results, and what state policymakers (and

4. Melissa Maynard, Which States are Most Innovative?, PEW CHARITABLE TR.
(Nov. 19, 2012), https ://www .pewtmsts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2012/11/19/which-states-are-most-innovative ("'California was always a fairly
innovative state, but it has become even more so,' Boehmke says. 'It's not only first but
it's first by a large margin. It's 50 percent more innovative than the second most
innovative state."'); Frederick J. Boehmke & Paul Skinner, State Policy Innovativeness
Revisited, 12 STATE POL. & POL'Y Q., 303, 320 (2012) (displaying a chart mapping the
innovation of States); see Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67
AM. POL. Ser. REV. 1174, 1184 (1973) (listing California and New York as most
innovative); see also Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion ofInnovations among the American
States, 63 AM. POL. Ser. REV. 880, 883 (1969) (ranking California as the third most
innovative state).
5. Worker misclassification is an issue that continues to plague the United States'
workforce. See discussion infra Part II.A for the effects of classifying workers as
employees versus independent contractors.
6. The COVID-19 crisis brought to light the importance of providing
unemployment insurance to all workers, not just employees. As well as showing that it
can be done. One prominent example is the Coronavims Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act, which expanded states' ability to provide unemployment
insurance for workers impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, including independent
contractors. Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). '"Ifwe think unemployment
insurance is a good idea, why would you be excluding work that's now characteristic of
so many jobs?' asked Erica Groshen, a senior labor economics advisor at Cornell
University and fonner commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics." Greg Iacurci,
13 Million Gig Workers Getting Unemployment Benefits, 4I% of the Total, CNBC,
https ://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/06/pua-unemployment-benefits-being-paid-to-about13-million-americans .html (last updated July 7, 2020).
7. Assemb. B. No. 5, § 2 (Cal. 2020) (adding LABOR CODE§ 2750.3; effective Jan.
1, 2020).
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Congress) should consider when deciding to adopt legislation like ABS, thus
highlighting that state and federal legislators are still talking about ABS. 8
Part II starts with a discussion of the problem that California was trying to
solve - worker misclassification and the uncertainty surrounding the
Dynamex v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 9 decision. This Part sets forth
the various ways that worker classification impacts a worker's life and
livelihood, as well as the economy. Part II then provides an overview of the
current state of California's (and most states') changing workforce to include
non-traditional work like app-based work.
Through ABS, California codified presumptive employee status for
workers in an effort to fix misclassification issues. Part III explains the
creation of ABS and how it works. This Part presents reactions from
workers, some of whom do not want to be reclassified as employees. While
not all will be represented herein, workers who spoke out regarding ABS
included court reporters, freelance writers and photographers, coaches,
truckers, performing artists (mimes, magicians, comedians, etc.), and
mus1c1ans.
As more industry representatives spoke up, additional
exemptions to ABS were codified into California's worker classification law
('WCL") 10 - 109 exemptions in total. 11 More and more, California's WCL
has started to look like grandma's patchwork quilt and less like a solution
that other states will want, or be able, to adopt. This Part concludes with a
review of the minimization of the WCL's goals due to this patchwork,
carved-up approach and the passing of Proposition 22 ("Prop 22").
Part IV discusses the benefits of experimental federalism and ways to
predict whether a statute or policy will diffuse using California's WCL as a
case study. Then, this Part explains two different mechanisms through which
legislation diffuses among states: learning and imitation. This Part explains
factors helpful to policymakers contemplating free-riding on another state's
legislation: relevancy of the policy to the contemplating state, the ease of
obtaining credible information from another state, and the costs of adopting,
8. See, e.g., John Lopez, Senate Ma1ority Leader Chuck Schumer Addresses ABC
Questions on PRO Act, MCHENRY CNTY. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2021), http://mchenry
countyblog.com/202 l/02/26/schmner02062 l/ (reporting Schumer assured Freelancers
Union that the U.S. Congress in the PRO Act will not make the same mistakes made in
California with AB5); see also 166 CONG. REC. H898 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2020) (statement
of Rep. Virginia Foxx) (" [T]his ... is little more than an attempt to protect the few wellconnected interests that received a carveout from the California Democrats' disastrous
Assembly Bill 5 .... ")
9. 416 P.3d 1 (2018).
10. The focus of this Article expands from the AB5 experiment into the California
worker classification law generally to include AB2257 where applicable. It will refer to
California's current worker classification law as the WCL.
11. Assemb. B. No. 2257 § 2 (Cal. 2020) (adding Article 1.5 and repealing LAB.
CODE§ 2750.3; effective Sept. 4, 2020). See Appendix A.
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implementing, and executing the statute. Part IV identifies that policymakers
from various states have admitted to waiting for the results of the ABS
experiment before deciding to free-ride by adopting it. It then analyzes
whether states are likely to free-ride on the WCL and shows that free-riding
will be detrimental to achieving optimal worker classification laws.
Finally, this Article concludes that though the ABS experiment provides
state policymakers with valuable information to consider, it should not be
adopted by other states or the federal government in its current iteration. The
continued experimentation through repeated amendments, while wellintentioned, is unlikely to provide an optimal solution in the near term, if at
all, and therefore fails to provide an adoptable statute for other states. I
contend that to maximize the benefits of experimental federalism, states,
both heterogenous and homogenous to California, should consider
California's experience and then start their own experiments. We have so
much more to learn and will be best poised to do so if states are willing to
experiment and share, rather than free-ride on California's law.
11. BACKGROUND

Work is changing. 12 And the change is being brought on by both hiring
entities and workers. Hiring entities are taking steps to change work.
Consider automation. 13 More specifically, consider receptionists, and how
most businesses now have auto attendants or if they do have individuals who
answer, those individuals are often not in an office. Amazon utilized a
heavily automated Human Resources department during the pandemic in
place of their usual human staff. 14 Also, consider that hiring entities know
that under current law it is economically cheaper to hire independent
contractors than employees, and so they gravitate toward a business model
or practice that utilizes more independent contractors. 15
Some workers are also gravitating toward a preference for independence .16
12. See The Future of Work: Preserving Worker Protections in the Modern
Economy: Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp., Lab., and Pensions and the Subcomm.
on Workforce Prats., 116th Cong. 1 (2019); see also, Robert Sprague, Updating Legal
Norms for a Precarious Workforce, 35 AB.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 86-91 (2020).
13. Sprague, supra note 12 at 87-88, 88 n.16; see also, Kathryn Kisska-Schulze &
Karie Davis-Nozemack, Humans vs. Robots: Rethinking Tax Policy for a More
Sustainable Future, 79 MD. L. REV. 1009, 1009 n.2, 1018-21 (2020).
14. Jodi Kantor, Karen Weise, & Grace Ashford, Power and Peril: 5 Takeaways on
Amazon's Employment Machine, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/06/15/us/politics/amazon-warehouse-workers.html.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See, Andre Dua, KweilinEllingrud, Michael Lazar, Ryan Luby, Matthew Petric,
Alex Ulyett, & Tucker Van Aken, Unequal America: Ten Insights on the State of
Economic Opportunity, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (May 26, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.
com/about-us/covid-response-center/inclusive-economy/unequal-america-ten-insights-
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Whether it is freelancing ("swing[ing] from project to project" 17), starting
their own business, or working for app-based companies, the opportunities
are abundant. 18 Many people who work traditional jobs are doing something
on the side to supplement their income. 19 Furthermore, some people have
family obligations and need work flexibility.2° Regardless of the reason,
many workers need and want flexibility; thus, they are driving, delivering,
repairing, cleaning, taking care of others' loved ones, and the like.
While our economy and work have been changing, our legislatures and
governmental agencies are struggling with how to balance protecting all
workers and preserving the desired independence of those who want and
need it. At the heart of this struggle is classifying workers. This Part
discusses why worker classification matters, and the modem workforce.
A. The Problem - Why Worker Classification Matters
The United States has been classifying workers as either "employees" or
"independent contractors" since 1857.2 1 A worker's classification has
on-the-state-of-economic-opportunity. The McKinsey report admits that it is difficult to
quantify how many people are working in contract, freelance, or temporary positions but
shows that of those polled, one-third of the workers prefer being independent while twothirds would prefer to be employed.
17. Dua, Ellingrud, Lazar, Luby, Petric, Ulyett, & Van Aken, supra note 16, at 36
n.25; see also, Dan Kedlney, I in 3 Americans Work on a Freelance Basis, TIME (Sept.
4, 2014, 2:05 PM), https://time.com/3268440/americans-freelance/.
18. See Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem:
Employee
Misclassification in the Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
341, 352 n.63-64 (2016) (citing to a 2015 GAO study "estimat[ing] that the nontraditional workforce ... comprised of 35.3 percent of all employed workers in 2006
[rising to] 40.4 percent in 2010" and further noting the "significant increase from a 1999
DOL study, which found that [non-traditional employment] comprised only 9.3 percent
of America's workforce").
19. Martha C. White, Who's Got a Side Hustle? Postgrad and People Earning
$80,000 or More, NBC, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/who-s-gotside-hustle-postgrads-people-earning-80-000-nl0l3621 (last updated June 5, 2019)
(finding approximately half of Americans supplement their income with a secondary
source).
20. Liya Palagashvili, C01mnent Letter on Department of Labor's Proposed Rule
Change, "Independent Contractor Status under the Fair Labor Standards Act" (Oct. 26,
2020), https://www .mercatus.org/system/files/palagashvili_ -_pie_ -_dol_proposed_rule
_change_on_employee_v. _independent_contractor_economic _realities_test_pic _ -_v 1
.pdf.
21. The common law distinction between employees and independent contractors
originated in England and was originally an agency law question. It was first
transplanted into the United States via Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 489-90 (1857). See
also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When it Sees One
and How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 302-03 (2001)
(discussing pre-industrial worker classifications); Gerard M. Stevens, The Test of the
Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188 (1939) (discussing the control test used to
determine employment relationships).
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economic, social, and legal importance. Those who are considered
employees qualify for benefits and have certain legal protections that
independent contractors do not. 22 The effects of being classified as an
employee include, among other things, discrimination protection, tax,
economic, and labor rights (e.g., right to class certification, right to organize,
wage/hour benefits, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation),
fiduciary duties, and tort liability .23 For instance, employees are protected
from discrimination but independent contractors are not. 24 Moreover,
employees have taxes withheld from their paycheck25 and their employer
pays half of their social security and Medicare taxes, 26 but since independent
contractors do not have "employers," they must remit their own taxes and
pay their social security and Medicare taxes in their entirety .2 7 Employees
also have a right to organize and be part of a class in court cases, whereas
independent contractors do not. 28 Additionally, employees, unless they are
exempt, are protected by minimum wage and hour laws - independent
contractors do not have these protections.2 9 Where legal duties are
concerned, employees owe their employers fiduciary duties while
independent contractors do not; 30 and an employee's tortious acts can cause

22. See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV. 661, 666-67 (2013).
23. Id.; see also V.B. Dubai, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism
ofLegal Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65, 74-75 (2017).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination by an employer because
of an employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l)
(prohibiting discrimination by an employer because of an employee's age); 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination by an employer because of an employee's
disability). Contra Orly Lobel, Coase & the Platform Economy, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW AND SHARING ECONOMY 67, 75 (Nestor M. Davidson, Michele
Finck, & John J. Infranca eds., 2018) (arguing that some policies, such as antidiscrimination laws, should apply to all who provide labor regardless of their employee
status).
25. See I.RC. §§ 340l(c), 3402 (requiring that employers withhold taxes for
employees).
26. See id.§§ 3101, 312l(d).
27. Independent contractors remit their social security and Medicare taxes on
Schedule SE when filing their Form 1040. See Self-Employment Tax (.'5ocial Security
and Medicare Taxes), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/self-employment-tax-social-security-and-medicare-taxes (last updated Mar.
14, 2022).
28. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157.
29. See id. §§ 206-07 (providing minimum wage and overtime protection for
employees).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. L. INST. 1958); Terry A.
O'Neill, Employees' Duty ofLoyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 681, 685 (1993) ("All employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their
employer .... ").
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their employer to be vicariously liable through respondeat superior for those
acts, but this is not true for independent contractors (save for some select
circumstances). 31 Also, employment-related benefits such as participation in
an employer's 40l(k) plan and health insurance exist for employees (often
on a tax-free basis), but if independent contractors want those benefits, they
have to acquire them themselves. Finally, independent contractors are not
covered by an employer's workers' compensation insurance and are not
generally entitled to unemployment compensation. 32
One would expect that since workers have to be classified as one or the
other, that there is an easy way to determine that status. Unfortunately, that
could not be further from the truth. 33 For some workers, the determination
is, in fact, easier than others, but for many non-traditional workers it is
complex. 34 There are numerous distinct factor-based tests from common

31. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006)
(assigning liability to employers for the "torts committed by employees while acting
within the scope of their employment"), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 409
(AM. L. INST. 1965) ("Except as stated in§§ 410-429, the employer of an independent
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the
contractor or his servants.").
32. During the Coronavirus Pandemic, the Federal Govermnent enacted the CARES
Act to provide states with the ability to open unemployment compensation to
independent contractors, including app-based workers. See Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2 (Cal.
2020) (adding LAB. CODE § 2750.3; effective Jan. 1, 2020). Although this legislation
would seem to recognize the importance of all workers to having unemployment
insurance, the current state of affairs in the United States is to only provide it for
employees.
33. Misclassifying workers is a rampant problem. For some hiring entities, the
misclassification of workers is unintentional and happens as a result of confusion. There
are other hiring entities that deliberately misclassify workers because it is economically
advantageous. See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in
the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification
Statutes, 18 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 53, 79-81 (2015) (describing how employers
may strategize to misclassify workers); see also Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & The
Future of Employment and Labor Law, 51 U. S. FLA. L. REV. 51, 59 (2017)
("Misclassification cases are difficult because the legal test used to detennine employee
status is notoriously messy. Like a good law school hypothetical, the facts of each of
these cases lend themselves to a cluttered balancing test.")
34. See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back
to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 479, 493-96 (2016) (arguing that applying factors
will yield over- or under-inclusiveness, making results unpredictable and difficult to
discern, and using an example of a difficult detennination: "Uber and Lyft drivers are
neither clearly employees nor clearly independent contractors under existing tests, as
typically understood," but as a normative matter, drivers should be classified as
employees); see also Michael H. LeRoy, Bare Minimum: Stripping Pay for Independent
Contractors in the Share Economy, 23 WM. &MARY J. WOMEN &L. 249, 260---68 (2017)
(arguing that exotic dancers should be classified as employees and reporting that out of
"seventy-five federal and state court rulings on wage and hour claims by dancers who
work for strip clubs, ... only three courts ruled that dancers were independent
contractors," however, "thirty-eight rulings detennined that dancers were employees,"
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law, regulatory agencies, and legislation, and they all apply the facts and
circumstances to draw their conclusion on the appropriate classification,
yielding inconsistent and thus confusing results. 35 These tests primarily
consider control in some way, but because the factors used for each test vary,
a worker can be classified as an employee under state labor laws but as an
independent contractor under state or federal tax laws. Differing standards
across numerous statutes "ha[ve] created a situation where the assignment of
responsibility has become opaque and less predictable for workers and
business organizations. " 36
This causes great uncertainty, and complexity in our workforce. Workers
do not know what they are legally entitled to and hiring entities do not know
what their obligations are. However, workers deserve to be more equally
protected. 37 The next section discusses the modem workforce and why
change is needed in worker classification laws.
B. The Modern Workforce
"The modern workplace has been profoundly transformed. " 38

More and more, workers are gravitating toward different ways to earn
money. Many people who work traditional jobs are supplementing their
income with side jobs. 39 Some workers, like parents, need more flexibility
than a traditional job can provide, so they have turned toward making their
own way, or working within the app-based economy. 40
and the rest did not detennine employment status).
35. E.g., Samantha J. Prince, The Shoe Is About to Drop for the Platform Economy:
Understanding the Current Worker Classification Landscape in Preparation for a
Changed World, 52 UNIV. MEM. L. REV. 101, 134-35 (2022); see Tanya Goldman &
David Weil, Who's Responsible Here? Establishing Legal Responsibility in the Fissured
Workplace 28 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 114, 2020).
36. Goldman & Weil, supra note 35 at 59; see Lobel, supra note 33, at 68 (noting
that the digital platfonn poses a variety of regulatory challenges, such as worker
classification).
37. See Symposium, Andrew Stewart & Jim Stanford, Regulating Work in the Gig
Economy: What are the Options?, 28 ECON. & LAB. L. REL. REV. 420,422 (2017).
38. DAVID WEIL, THEFISSUREDWORKPLACE: WHYWORKBECAMESOBADFORSO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7 (2014 ).
39. In fact, according to Brett Collins et al., the exponential growth in work in the
online platfonn economy "is driven by individuals whose primary annual income derives
from traditional jobs and who supplement that income with platfonn-mediated work."
Brett Collins, Andrew, Garin, Emilie Jackson, Dmitri Koustas, & Mark Payne, Is Gig
Work Replacing Traditional Employment? Evidence from Two Decades of Tax Returns
3 (Mar. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://www .irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19
rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalemployment.pdf.
40. Dani Blmn & Laura Vanderkam, The Gig Economy Offers Parents Options and
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/parenting/
gig-economy-part-time-work.html (noting the number of parents working in the gig
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"Gig," "platform," or "app-based" businesses are internet marketplaces
that connect producers or service providers with consumers, as opposed to
creating a product and dealing directly with the consumer. 41 One UK
governmental study used a working definition to characterize the gig or appbased economy as, the "exchange of [labor] for money between individuals
or companies via digital platforms that actively facilitate matching between
providers and customers, on a short-term and payment by task basis." 42 Said
another way, the gig economy is a popular online business model by which:
individuals with "underutilized assets" - whether they be "time, particular
skills, vehicles, household goods, spare bedrooms, or even home-cooked
meals - connect with other people or businesses seeking those assets. " 43
Probably the most well-known app-based businesses include: Uber, Lyft,
Postmates, DoorDash, Instacart, goPuff, Handy, Washio, Caviar, Fiverr,
GrubHub, Amazon Flex, TaskRabbit, Thumbtack, Upwork, Freelancer,
YourMechanic, and Amazon Mechanical Turk. So many platforms exist that
it is easy to imagine a point at which any type of work - no matter how
complicated or how dependent on others - could be ordered with the click
of an app. 44
As Dean Weil has acknowledged, "[e]mployment is no longer the clear
relationship between a well-defined employer and a worker." 45 Workers that
are classified as independent contractors are no longer primarily those who
are entrepreneurs with bargaining power. 46 This is particularly true in the
non-traditional, app-based world. In considering this shift from traditional
employer/employee relationships to app-based work, we can see a

economy is increasing).
41. See Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Geoffrey G. Parker & Sangeet Pau Choudary,
Pipelines, Platforms, and the New Rules of Strategy, HARV. Bus. REV. (Apr. 2016),
https ://hbr.org/2016/04/pipelines-platforms-and-the-new-mles-of-strategy; see also
Marina Lao, Workers in the "Gig" Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust
Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1572-73 (2018); Keith CunninghamPanneter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the Real Independent Contractors of Platform
Work, 39 N. ILL. U. L. Rev. 379, 386 (2019).
42. Katriina Lepanjuuri, Robert Wishart & Peter Cornick, The Characteristics of
those in the Gig Economy, DEP'T BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY 9 (Feb. 2018),
https ://assets. publishing. service.gov. uk/govenunent/uploads/system/uploads/attachmen
t_data/file/687 553/The _characteristics_of_those _in_the _gig_economy .pdf.
43. Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying to
Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes, 31 AB.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53, 54 (2015).
44. The Future of Gig Work is Female: A Study on the Behaviors and Career
Aspirations of Women in the Gig Economy HYPERWALLET (2017), https://www.hyper
wallet.com/app/uploads/HW_ The _Future_of_ Gig_Work_is _Female.pdf (noting gig
work can also be divided into three categories, only one of which is app-based:
professional freelancers, direct sales (like Mary Kay), and app-based platfonns).
45. See WEIL, supra note 3 8, at 7.
46. See id. at 23-25.
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"downward pressure on wages and benefits, murkiness about who bears
responsibility for work conditions, and increased likelihood that basic labor
standards will be violated." 47 In just a few words, Dean Weil's statement
says a lot. It sets forth an important reason why policymakers are concerned
with classification of their workers, particularly app-based workers, and one
reason why the California legislature enacted AB5. Part III addresses
California's unique approach to classifying workers and the commencement
of what I refer to as its "experiment."
III. CALIFORNIA'S APPROACH: AB5
In addressing its labor and wage issues, California seemingly had three
choices: 1) keep the status quo (using the Borello test); 48 2) adopt a law from
another state - that was utilized by its Supreme Court in Dynamex 49 - and
customize it to California's unique and large workforce; or 3) create a novel
approach. Ultimately, California implemented a unique combination of the
first two options.
Borello
(l</~9)

Dynamex
{WIS)

L-..ll

I

~---~

AB5
!Sep. 2CH9}

Fig. 1 Depiction of the life and composition of California's WCL.

47. Id. at 8. This in tum leads to a "rise in profitability for the lead companies who
operate at the top of industries and increasingly precarious working conditions for
workers at lower levels." Id.; see also Dubai, supra note 23, at 103. See generally Peter
Gibbins, Extending Employee Protections to Gig-Economy Workers Through the
Entrepreneurial Opportunity Test of Fedex Home Delivery, 57 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y
183, 194-95 (2018) (noting that modem supply chains, outsourcing and franchise
networks which exert"' downward pressure on wages,' and the growing gig economy are
all examples of' this clear shift away from traditional employer/employee relationships).
48. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't oflndus. Reis., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). In
1989, the California Supreme Court reviewed numerous tests for determining worker
classification and determined that the "control-of-work details" factor test should be
used. See infra Part III.B.ii. The case involved workers' compensation coverage for
cucumber harvesting workers. The court ultimately decided when applying the factors
that the workers were employees, not independent contractors. This factor test is what
is referred to as the "Borello test" throughout this Article.
49. In 2018, the California Supreme Court first utilized the ABC test in the worker
classification case Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). The court decided that Dynamex's one-day delivery
service drivers are employees for purposes of the California wage order governing the
transportation industry. Id. at 7. In CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8 § l 1090.2(D), the wage order
defines "employ" to mean "to engage, suffer or permit to work." See id. at 13. The court
implemented that standard by incorporating the ABC test for the first time in California.
Id. at 7, 34.
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On September 18, 2019, California enacted Assembly Bill 5. 50 ABS
codified the ABC test from a similar Massachusetts statute 51 after it was used
by the California Supreme Court in Dynamex. 52 Because the Dynamex
court's use of the ABC test confused businesses and workers, the California
legislature was compelled to "act fast" to provide clarity. 53 ABS, which
includes the ABC test, was created to fix the misclassification problem by
purportedly making it "easier" for hiring entities to know how to classify
workers. It does this by presuming that certain workers are employees unless
the three elements of the ABC test are met. 54 If the elements are proven, then
a worker is classified as an independent contractor. That sounds
straightforward enough, but in application it is not.
ABS and its use of the ABC test codified important protections for workers
who come within the presumptive employee status. However, there was
significant outcry from businesses, workers, and organizations with respect
to the default employee classification. 55 And, some workers have said that
ABS will destroy their industries. 56 The California legislature continues to
amend the statute to address vocalized concerns through carve-outs from the
ABC test portion of ABS.
This Part discusses the goals of ABS by setting forth the statute and its
carve-outs. It then details how Prop 22 minimized AB5's mission to protect
app-based drivers by continuing to characterize them as independent
contractors and providing fewer benefits than they would receive as
employees.
50. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. California's AB5 statute was
enacted to give more workers in its labor force certain state labor law protections. Appbased and other workers are being misclassified as independent contractors and are
thereby being exploited through lack of employment law protections: minimum wage,
overtime, workers' compensation coverage, and unemployment compensation coverage.
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2020). Nearly two-thirds of states use the
ABC test to detennine unemployment insurance eligibility, but California's use of it goes
well beyond how other states have used the ABC test. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
COVERAGE 1-4-1-6 (2014 ), http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/
2014/coverage.pdf.
52. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35-42.
53. Lorena Gonzalez, Understanding AB2257, Follow Up Legislation to AB5, and
Its Impact on the Arts Sector, CALIFORNIANS FOR THE ARTS (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www .californiansforthearts.org/calendar/2020/10/7/understanding-ab-2257-thefollow-up-legislation-to-ab-5-and-its-impact-on-the-arts-sector.
54. See infra Part III.B.i; see also Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 33, at 98.
55. E.g., 166 Cong. Rec. H894 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2020) (Statement of Rep. Ryan)
(entering into the Record a copy of a letter written by an employee explaining the
negative public reaction to the default employee classification and referencing the effects
of AB5 in California); see also id. (statement of Rep. Wright).
56. Id. at H890 (statement of Rep. Foxx) (recounting the experience of an American
Sign Language interpreter who, after the implementation of AB5, lost all three of his
agencies).
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The Goals ofAB5

California Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez set forth the goals of ABS
when she addressed the California Assembly while proposing amendments
to the newly enacted ABS:
In 2019, I authored AB 5 to provide clarity for workers, businesses and
taxpayers in the wake of the California Supreme Court's unanimous 2018
Dynamex ruling that established a three-part ABC test for determining
employment status. The stricter test makes it clear that workers who have
been historically misclassified and kept off payroll as employees including janitorial workers, construction workers, port truck drivers,
home health aides, hotel and hospitality workers, delivery and rideshare
drivers - are entitled to basic employment rights under all of the state's
labor laws, such as the right to minimum wage, overtime, unemployment
insurance, workers' compensation, paid sick days, paid family leave,
workplace protections against discrimination and retaliation, and the right
to form or join a union. 57
California's inclusion of the ABC test in ABS is well-intentioned and can
produce some good results for some workers. "[T]he ABC [t]est is a shield
by which workers may protect themselves from the coercion, undue pressure,
and unequal bargaining power of [hiring entities] wishing to minimize labor
costs while exploiting the unfortunate situation of the unemployed
worker. " 58 It provides that currently misclassified workers be reclassified as
employees so that they will be entitled to minimum wage, overtime, workers'
compensation, and unemployment insurance. 59 While this applies to more
than gig/app-based work, many considered ABS a "gig worker law."
After eight years of looking the other way, California officials are finally
enforcing the rule of law against ... so-called gig companies ....
Because regulators chose not to enforce existing labor laws against the
companies, they were allowed to grow precarious work - not just in this
state, but all over the world. 60

57. Hearing on AB 1850 Before the Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Appropriations 2020
Leg. Sess. 2 (June 2, 2020) (statement of Chair Lorena Gonzalez), https://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml ?bill_id=20 l 920200AB 1850.
58. Christopher J. Cotnoir, Employees or Independent Contractors: A Call for
Revision of Maine's Unemployment Compensation "ABC Test", 46 ME. L. REV. 325,
344 (1994).
59. See Assemb. B. No. 5, § 2 (Cal. 2020) (adding LAB. CODE § 2750.3; effective
Jan. 1, 2020).
60. Michael Hiltzik, Pressure Builds on Uber and Lyfl under California's Gig
Worker Law, L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
business/story/2020-07-03/uber-lyft-ab5-contractor (quoting Professor Veena Dubai,
labor law expert at UC's Hastings School of Law).
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Thus, the statute is a "step in the right direction" toward protecting appbased workers around the country. 61
ABS and other presumption-of-employee laws are designed to eliminate
or reduce worker misclassification. This is not a unique phenomenon;
rebuttable presumptions favoring a default employee status have been
implemented in numerous countries, most recently as part of the European
Union Commission's Proposed Directive to establish minimum labor
standards for app-based workers in its member states. 62 Having a default
status can minimize uncertainty for both hiring entities and workers. 63

B. The Tests ofAB5
To clarify the Dynamex decision's applicability, California enacted ABS
and its initial iteration became effective January 1, 2020. 64 ABS incorporated
the ABC test but added an extensive list of occupational exceptions 65 that
will be tested under California's previously established Borello test66 instead
of the ABC test. 67
i.

The ABC Test

The ABC test portion of ABS reads:
[A] person providing labor or services for remuneration shall be
considered an employee rather than an independent contractor unless the
hiring entity demonstrates that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity
in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract
for the performance of the work and in fact. (B) The person performs
work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business.
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established
61. Brian A. Brown II, Your Uber Driver is Here, but Their Benefits Are Not: The
ABC Test, Assembly Bill 5 and Regulating Gig Economy Employers, 15 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 183, 208 (2020).
62. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for
Twenty-First Century Work: The "Independent Worker," HAMILTON PROJECT 6 (2015)
(citing ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), NON
REGULAR EMPLOYMENT, JOB SECURITY AND THE LABOUR MARKET DIVIDE (2014)),
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/emo20 l 4-annex-chapter4.pdf. ("( e.g., Czech Republic,
Estonia, France [in selected circumstances], Mexico, The Netherlands, [and]
Portugal)."); Proposal for a Directive ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council on
Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, at 3 COM (2021) 762 final (Dec. 9,
2021); see also Prince, supra note 35, at Part III.A.
63. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 62, at 6.
64. Assemb. B. No. 5, § 2 (Cal. 2020) (adding LAB. CODE§ 2750.3; effective Jan. 1,
2020).
65. See infra Appendix A.
66. See infra Part III.B.ii.
67. Id.
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trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the
work performed. 68
California's version of the ABC test very closely mimics that of
Massachusetts. 69 The ABC test presumes employee status unless the hiring
entity satisfies all elements of the test, in which case the worker will be
classified as an independent contractor. 70 If the worker is deemed an
employee under the test, they are entitled to coverage under the California
labor laws: minimum wage, overtime pay, workers' compensation, and
unemployment. This application of the ABC test is broader than in other
states and provides uniformity across California's labor code. 71
Numerous states and commenters favor the presumption of employment
because it challenges employers who may have been trying to utilize certain
business models to evade the law. 72 The presumption puts employers on
notice that "they must observe the independent contracting boundaries."73
Ron Herrera, Teamsters International Vice President and Director of the
Port Division, lauded the new statute by stating, "[t]he ABC test [contained
within ABS] ... streamlines the process of establishing employee
status ... [which is] even more pressing during this current public health and
humanitarian crisis where port truck drivers are suffering disproportionally
from the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic due to rampant and systemic
misclassification .... " 74
Since the ABC test part of ABS has only three elements, it is simpler and
should conceivably improve predictability, thereby reducing uncertainty. 75
Thus, it is heralded by worker spokespersons as the "most objective" test and
"the most difficult for employers to manipulate." 76 Because hiring entities
68. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(a) (West 2020).
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. "Massachusetts did not create the
ABC test," but rather, Maine did in 1935. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 33, at
65, 65 n.66.
70. ABC Test, CORNELL L. SCHL. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.comell.
edu/wex/abc_test (last visited Jan. 8, 2022).
71. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 33 at 64-71 (describing various
states' application of the ABC test).
72. Id. at71-72.
73. Id. at 72. But see Karen R. Hamed, Georgine M. Kryda, & Elizabeth A. Milito,
Creating a Workable Legal Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J. Bus.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 102 (2010) ("[B]y creating the presumption of
employment, the ABC Test makes it harder for employers to create unconventional
employment relationships with workers.").
74. Press Release, Teamsters Port Division Director Comments on AB5 (Mar. 21,
2020 ), https ://teamster.org/2020/03 /teamsters-port-division-director-comments-ab5/.
75. Prince, supra note 35, at 154.
76. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 33, at 67 (citing CATHERINE K.
RUCKELSHAUS & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NELP SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
REFORMS 5 (2011 ), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/20 l llndependen
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financially benefit from classifying workers as independent contractors, it
seems appropriate that they be forced to overcome the presumption.
However, scholars have pointed out that "the ABC test is no panacea with
respect to employee/independent contractor classification," 77 that it is "no
model of clarity," 78 that it "may result in both over- and underinclusiveness,"79 and that it "introduces new interpretative challenges to the
determination of employee status." 80 The carve-outs provided for in ABS
(and subsequently AB2257) appear to be California's way of dealing with
the over-inclusiveness; 81 however, one can posit that it has gone too far with
its law - many workers are now back to where they started, making the law
under-inclusive (again).
ii.

The Borello Test

The next statutory section in ABS provides that the ABC test, and
correspondingly its presumptive employee status, does not apply to certain
occupations as codified.
Instead, classification as an employee or
independent contractor for those delineated occupations shall be governed
by Borello. 82 The Borello test has been used by California since 1989 and is
still retained for certain occupations that are deemed exempt from the ABC
test. 83 Like the ABC test, the Borello test analyzes the extent of the hiring
entity's control over the alleged employee. But unlike the ABC test, the
Borello test employs a multi-factor test to determine a worker's
classification. These factors have evolved to become: 84

tContractorRefonnUpdate.pdf.
77. Robert Sprague, Using the ABC Test to Classify Workers: End of the PlatformBased Business Model or Status Quo Ante?, 11 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 733, 767
(2020).
78. Edward A. Zelinsky, Defining Who is an Employee After A.B.5: Trading
Uniformity and Simplicity for Expanded Coverage, 70 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2020).
79. Goldman & Weil, supra note 35, at 46.
80. Zelinsky, supra note 78, at 29; see also Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a
Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm ofEmployee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L. J. 111, 129 (2008).
81. Other states provide carve-outs as well but none as many as California. For
example, see Cotnoir, supra note 58, at 332-34 (stating that-at the time of their writing
- Maine's Employment Security Law contained thirty-seven carve-outs from the ABC
test.)
82. CAL. LAB. CODE§ 2750.3(b) (West 2020); see S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't
of Indus. Reis., 769 P.2d 399 (1989). See generally Benjamin Powell, Identity Crisis:
The Misclassification of California Uber Drivers, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 459 (2017)
(discussing the Borello Framework and its application to Uber).
83. There are currently 109 such exemptions. See Appendix A.
84. The most up-to-date list of factors used under the Borello test is provided by
Independent Contractor Versus
California Department of Industrial Relations.
Employee, CAL. DEP'T INDUS. RELS., https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_indepen
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(a) Whether the potential employer has all necessary control over the
manner and means of accomplishing the result desired (although such
control need not be direct, actually exercised or detailed);
(b) Whether the worker performing services holds themselves out as being
engaged in an occupation or business distinct from that of the employer;
(c) Whether the work is a regular or integral part of the employer's
business;
(d) Whether the employer or the worker supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place for the worker doing the work;
(e) Whether the worker has invested in the business, such as in the
equipment or materials required by their task;
(f) Whether the service provided requires a special skill;
(g) The kind of occupation, and whether the work is usually done under
the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(h) The worker's opportunity for profit or loss depending on their
managerial skill;
(i) The length of time for which the services are to be performed;
G) The degree of permanence of the working relationship;
(k) The method of payment, whether by time or by the job;
(1) Whether the worker hires their own employees;
(m) Whether the employer has a right to fire at will or whether a
termination gives rise to an action for breach of contract; and
(n) Whether or not the worker and the potential employer believe they are
creating an employer-employee relationship (this may be relevant, but the
legal determination of employment status is not based on whether the
parties believe they have an employer-employee relationship).
The Borello test is generally used when the ABC test does not apply (see
Appendix A for the ABC test exemptions). However, for some workers, the
Borello test will not apply instead of the ABC test unless the hiring entity
satisfies other requirements first. 85 ABS is quite complex and likely difficult
for the public to understand and comply with. 86

C. The Issues Created by AB5
"California's A.B. 5, is an obsolete artifact of an American economy in
which labor markets were defined primarily by factories and traditional
trades. "87

dentcontractor.htm (last updated Jan. 2022).
85. Id.

86. See Zelinsky, supra note 78, at 26-34.
87. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Comment Letter to the Department of Labor's Wage & Hour
Division's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 1 (Oct. 2020) (on file with author). Professor
Perritt, fonner Deputy Under Secretary of Labor (Ford administration), continues:
"Legal categories of work must evolve to reflect how new technologies have changed
the way workers interact with those that pay for their services."
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While ABS was created to provide clarity from the Dynamex opinion,
using the ABC test's elements does not necessarily accomplish this goal. 88
For example, for purposes of the second element, how does one define the
term "usual course of business," and what is deemed to be "outside" of it?
The California courts will be left to decide how to define such ambiguities,
and this can lead to uncertainty. 89 "Leaving this task up to the judicial branch
will potentially take years to get a clear determination of how the test is to
be applied and also may not follow exactly the legislative intent. " 90
ABS was designed to protect workers, but it also serves to protect
employers "who compete with companies that misclassify, and to shield
California from the loss of revenue from companies using misclassification
to avoid payment obligations such as payroll taxes, premiums for workers'
compensation, Social Security, unemployment, and disability insurance."91
Despite these important goals, ABS was not embraced with open arms by all.
Problematically, not all workers want to, or can, give up their independent
working relationships. 92 Under the current U.S. binary worker classification
regime - employee or independent contractor - when hiring entities
control their workers, those workers are more likely to be considered
employees. 93 Many American workers who are currently classified as
88. Zelinsky, supra note 78, at 33 ("Whatever the merits of A.B.5 might be,
unifonnity, simplicity, and certainty are not among these.").
89. See Brown II, supra note 61, at 204 (advocating for defined tenns in the statute
to reduce uncertainty and showing that there were varying interpretations of the ABC
test in Massachusetts).
90. Id. at 205.
91. Chris Carosa, Will California's AB5 Law Gag Your Gig Retirement, FORBES
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www .forbes.com/sites/chriscarosa/2020/02/27/will-califomiasab5-law-gag-your-gig-retirement/?sh=4609a43b6518 (quoting Paul Kramer, Director of
Compliance at Workforce in the greater Detroit Area).
92. Kevin Kiley, AB 5 Stories: Testimonials of Californians Who Have Lost Their
Livelihoods, https ://ad06 .asmrc .org/sites/default/files/districts/ad06/files/AB 5%20Boo
klet_0.pdf (quoting Marlene, "AB 5 has impacted my life. I am self employed by choice.
I do not want to be an employee nor do I want to lose my tax exemptions as a company.
I should not be forced into employment relationships with my clients, most of which will
not hire me anymore if they are forced to become my employers. This law will destroy
my business.").
93. "The control test holds that a worker is an employee if the hiring entity
'controlled or had the right to control the mamier and means' of the worker's work."
SAMANTHA J. PRINCE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP LAW: COMPANY CREATION, https://psu.pb.
unizin.org/expsk909/chapter/tests/.
[S]everal federal statutes and their corresponding administrative agencies use the
control test to determine a worker's classification for reasons other than tort
liability: Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA), Internal Revenue Code (IRC), National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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independent contractors and enjoy their autonomy to work when they want
and for how many hours they want, view laws that will reclassify them as
laws that will strip them of their freedoms. 94 They do not want to relinquish
their "freedom from non-interference" (no supervisory intervention, no one
setting their schedule, no one capping their earning potential) or their
"freedom from non-domination" (no one with power to discipline and restrict
choices and no one to put workers in a state of uncertainty that will constrain
their autonomy). 95 Workers assume that if the law requires them to be
employees, that the hiring entity who is now an employer, will impose more
control over them or strip them of their freedoms. This does not have to be
the case, but in practicality, it likely is. 96
Some independent contractors find ABS insulting as they feel they can
adequately negotiate their own contracts. 97 As Americans, we live in a
"society and culture [that] values personal autonomy, rugged individualism,
Americans appreciate and
self-determination, and self-reliance."98
sometimes insist upon autonomy. 99 This insistence or preference for
autonomy aligns with our modem workforce that seeks flexibility to do other
things and to spend less time in a particular job; i.e., "how to manage their
livelihood. " 100 However, not all workers have bargaining power and this
1964, and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN).
Id.; see also Bodie, supra note 22, at 679; Michael W. Fox, Whos' an Employee, Who's
the Employer? It's Not as Easy as You Might Think, 2016 TXCLE ADV. Bus. L. 1,
appendix 25 (2016).
94. Deepa Das Acevedo, Unbundling Freedom in the Sharing Economy, 91 S. CAL.
L. REV. 793, 797 (2018).
95. Id. at 808-25.
96. See generally Dynamex Operations W. Inc. v. Super. Ct L.A. Cnty., 416 P.3d 1,
38 n.28 (Cal. 2018) ("[I]f a business concludes that it improves the morale and/or
productivity of a category of workers to afford them the freedom to set their own hours
or to accept or decline a particular assigmnent, the business may do so while still treating
the workers as employees .... ").
97. "One artistic director at last week's rally smmned it up for the Chico EnterpriseRecord: 'We are not stupid. We do not need to be saved from ourselves. We can
negotiate our own contracts. AB5 is insulting."' 166 CONG. REC. H891 (daily ed. Feb.
6, 2020).
98. Peter H. Huang & Kelly J. Poore, Can You Hear Me Later and Believe Me Now?
Behavioral Law and Economics of Chronic Repeated Ambient Acoustic Pollution
Causing Noise-Induced (Hidden) Hearing Loss, 29 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 193,
209 (2020).
99. See Kiley, supra note 92 (quoting Amy, "Having this AB 5 in place will
completely change how I work and when I work. I am a notary public, commissioned
by the State of California. I perfonn notary acts for the general public and loan signings
for title companies. I choose when and where I work. With these uncertain times set
before us today, people like me need the flexibility to be there for our children, assisting
with their distance learning and working around their schedule. I choose when I work, I
choose how much I work! Why are our choices being taken away?").
100. See Jennifer Wright, Why California's AB-5 is a Threat to the American Way of
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should be a consideration when determining an optimal worker classification
law. 101
Additionally, ABS has been criticized as legislation that is detrimental to
women who rely on alternative, flexible work arrangements. 102 Caregivers,
who are disproportionately women, require flexible hours and may rely on
flexible work for their primary job as well as a supplemental job. 103 When it
comes to the app-based economy, if one removes ridesharing drivers
(predominately men) from the calculation, women constitute a larger share
of platform workers. 104 Women who are unable to satisfy the requirements
of traditional work arrangements and yet will be classified as employees
under ABS, will suffer great harm by having difficulty in getting/keeping
these work relationships. 105 Take Rona Prestler talking about her work
Life, N.Y. POST (Oct. 26, 2019, 12:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/10/26/whycalifornias-ab-5-is-a-threat-to-the-american-way-of-life/.
101. See Rogers, supra note 34, at 494 (noting that there exists "unequal bargaining
power" between some workers and hiring entities, signaling a "democratic deficit and/or
inequality"); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent
Contractor Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279,
282-83 (2011); Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A
Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 377-87
(2002). But see Goldman & Weil, supra note 35, at 59.
102. See Palagashvili, supra note 20 (detailing how AB5 may be hannful to women).
103. See JAMES MANYIKA, SUSAN LUND, JACQUES BUGHIN, KELSEY ROBINSON, JAN
MISCHKE & DEEP A MAHAJAN, INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE, NECESSITY, AND THE GIG
ECONOMY 76 (2016). "Women were significantly more likely to note that flexibility
was a more important motivator for independent work than men (74 percent vs. 59
percent)." Palagashvili, supra note 20, at 3 (quoting MBO PARTNERS, THE STATE OF
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA: RISING CONFIDENCE AMID AMA TURING MARKET 5 (2017));
see also Linda N. Edwards & ElizabethField-Hendrey, Home-Based Work and Women's
Labor Force Decisions, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 170 (2002).
104. See DIANA FARRELL, FIONA GREIG & AMAR HAMOUDI, THE ONLINE PLATFORM
ECONOMY IN 2018: DRIVERS, WORKERS, SELLERS, AND LESSORS 18, 22 (2018); see also
HYPERWALLET, supra note 44; Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, Understanding
Trends in Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 25425, 2019); Lawrence F. Katz & AlanB. Krueger, The Rise
and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22667, 2018).
105. Palagashvili, supra note 20, at 5 ("Proponents of policies such as California's
AB 5 overlook the consequences of such policies for the types of independent jobs that
attract women. [] [T]o the extent that specific platform companies such as Etsy and
Care.com provide flexibility of work for those who need it and extend work opportunities
to women who would otherwise be unable to take on traditional employment, challenges
to the legal classification of independent contractors could disproportionately hinder
women's participation on those platfonns. In fact, when debating the legislation,
California did not compare the potential benefits and the potential harms of AB 5
specifically to women."); see also Elaine Pofeldt, California's AB5 Leaves Women
Business Owners Reeling, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2020, 8:23 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/elainepofeldt/2020/01/ 19/californias-ab5-leaves-women-business-owners-ree
ling/?sh=d9cf6385ef36.
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through HireMyMom.com:
I would work before [my kids] woke up. I had a nanny come in the
morning. I'd hang out with the kids during the afternoon and get back to
work at night. I got in a good number of hours with minimal childcare. It
was just perfect. 106
ABS can change a worker's classification by law, but it cannot require
hiring entities to continue to use California workers who have been
reclassified as employees.
I've been a freelance writer and editor for 25 years. Working freelance
has allowed me to raise my daughter from the day she came home from
the hospital to the present (she's 10), pick and choose both the work I do
and the hours and days I do it, and work with incredible employers who
have (with very few exceptions) AL WAYS had my best interests at heart.
ABS will force me to leave jobs that I've held for over a decade and join
a growing pool of other freelancers who are grabbing at the few freelance
jobs that will be left for us. 107
This comment highlights the issue of availability - that there will be
fewer employee jobs than there are freelancers that need to work.
As a result of either confusion or being forced to reclassify workers as
employees, some hiring entities are rebuffing California workers and using
out-of-state workers who are not covered by California's ABS or an ABC
test-like statute. 108 Take for example, Vox Media's announcement that in
106. Pofeldt, supra note 105; see also, Kiley, supra note 92 (quoting Jessica, "As a
freelance court reporter, I choose when to work, what jobs to take ... I do not want to be
an employee. As a new mom I can tell agencies that I only want afternoon work ... or
that I only want to work on Tuesdays and Thursdays. As an employee, I would not get
to pick a schedule that works for me.").
107. See Kiley, supra note 92 (quoting Paul).
108. See, e.g., id. (quoting Janet, "There is no way my clients are going to hire me as
an employee to work on sporadic projects during the year, so I will lose the ability to
augment my social security and I'm not eligible for SNAP benefits. I'm 67 years old,
on Social Secutity [sic] and if I can't find a full time job at this point, I can't pay the rent
and eat."); id. (quoting Deborah, 'Tm a 67-year-old grandmother living on Social
Security. Up until Jan 1st I was also an online transcriptionist earning approx $200 a
month in much needed additional income. I love the work and it is a perfect fit for workfrom-home situations, however due to AB 5, California residents were dropped by the
world-wide company I was working for."); id. (quoting Sarah, "I have been a full time
small business owner and artist for 10 years and this law is hurting small businesses.
This law makes it difficult for small businesses to hire independent writers, graphic
designers, virtual assistants, marketing reps, and other necessary Gig work that helps
small businesses to be able to grow. It's going to take the arts, music, literature, and
culture out of our lives by forcing artists to either incorporate, which is extremely cost
prohibitive in California, or to stop producing art, meaning that the patrons of the arts
will lose access to art programming that enriches the lives of the people in our
communities. People who choose to work as Freelance workers have chosen this path
because they want the flexibility to set their own hours and rates and work when they
want and they will no longer be able to excel in their creative fields under ABS. This
law hurts the lower and middle class people who have side gigs, creative gigs, or are
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order to comply with ABS, it will cease using all California freelance writers
that report on the California sports teams for its SB Nation blogs. 109 Instead,
it reported that it will hire 20 full-time and part-time employees to replace
those 200 'low-paid' freelancers. 110 Hiring 20 employees at the expense of
replacing 200 other workers is likely an unintended result of ABS' s
presumption and the larger scale good it attempts to accomplish. Another
example was put forth by Rona Prestler, the HireMyMom.com worker noted
above. One client of hers let her go because they could not afford to pay her
salary, and an out-of-state client let her go "concerned that a lack of clarity
in the language of [ABS] might lead to a risk of fines later on. "lll
Because of AB5's sweeping reclassification of some workers, numerous
businesses and workers have expressed their concerns, frustration, and
sometimes anger. 112 Thus, organizations representing industries spoke out.
In February 2020, the Sacramento Bee reported that the California legislature
had "nearly three dozen bills" to consider as to how "to clean up or repeal
the landmark gig economy law." 113 In response to organizational pleas, in
September 2020, the California legislature passed AB2257, a law that
replaced ABS with more exemptions (now, 109 in total). 114 Because the
legislature and Uber could not reach an agreement for an app-based driver

trying to launch their own small business.").
109. Susanna Hussain, Vax Media Cuts Hundreds of Freelance Journalists as AB5
Changes Loom, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
business/story/20 l 9-12- l 7/vox-media-cuts-hundreds-freelancers-ab5.
110. Id. This was Vox Media's stance prior to the enactment of AB2257, and it may
have changed now that AB2257 eliminated the thirty-five pieces per year requirement
that brought freelance writers within the purview of AB5's ABC test.
lll. Pofeldt, supra note 105; see Cotnoir, supra note 58, at 344 ("[The ABC Test]
creates a burden for truly 'independent contractors' who might not find work due to
employers' fear of unemployment contribution liability detennined long after the
services have been fully perfonned .... ").
ll2.

The debates over AB5 in California, however, resulted in the legislature excluding
a number of occupations from the ABC test, including, for example, licensed
insurance agents, . . . doctors and dentists, lawyers, architects, engineers,
registered securities broker-dealers or investment advisers, direct sales
salespersons, real estate licensees, and workers providing licensed barber or
cosmetology services, and others performing work under a contract for
professional services, with another business entity, or pursuant to a subcontract in
the construction industry.
Goldman & Weil, supra note 35, at 49.
ll3. "Democrats say the law needs fine-tuning; Republicans want to overhaul it."
Hannah Wiley, California's New Labor Law is a Work in Progress. Here's How
Lawmakers Could Change It, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 24, 2020, 10:02 AM),
https://www .sacbee.com/news/politics-govermnent/capitol-alert/article24026490 l .html
#story link=cpy.
ll4. See infra Part III.D.
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exemption, well-known driving app-based companies went to the people and
successfully gained exemption (albeit temporarily) from AB5's reach by
winning a California November 2020 ballot initiative, Prop 22. 115 Prop 22
has been working its way through the California court system and currently
has been found unconstitutional. 116
D. Carving out Exemptions from the ABC Test
"[AB5] is replete with exceptions, exemptions and interpretive challenges
which make the law of employee status even more complicated and
unclear than it was before. "117

The ABC test in the WCL was designed to catch hiring entities who
misclassify workers as independent contractors. However, because some
workers are legitimately independent contractors or the industries in which
they operate cannot function by over-inclusively reclassifying workers to
employee status, the California legislature included carve-outs or
exemptions in ABS and even more in AB2257. Seemingly, this is necessary
to accommodate business models that are not misclassifying workers. But
sometimes, "legislatures will ... include carve-outs, which often reflect
political will and power rather than a need to re-balance power in a working
relationship." 118 This is not a new concept when it comes to the ABC test. 119
Initially, there were over 50 exemptions from the ABC test to be
considered under Borello. These carve-outs can be viewed as a product of
politics and industries coming forward to criticize using the ABC test for
select occupations. 120 However, the carve-outs also represent California's
customization of the ABC test to fit the needs of its residents and an attempt
to avoid over-inclusiveness. While some commentators criticize the carveouts, others laud them. 121
Freelancers of many kinds, particularly freelance writers, photojournalists,
and photographers, expressed their concerns over ABS as enacted in

115. See infra Part III.E.
116. See id.
117. Zelinsky, supra note 78, at 3-4 ("A.B.5 ... make[s] the law of employee status
even more complex and less uniform than it was before.").
118. Goldman & Weil, supra note 35, at 50.
119. See Cotnoir, supra note 58, at 332-34.
120. See supra note 112.
121. See Zelinsky, supra note 78, at 34-38 (noting criticisms of the carve-outs). See
generally Letter from Sean P. Redmond, Exec. Dir., Lab. Pol'y Emp. Pol'y Div., U.S.
Chamber of Com. to Sen. Stephen M. Sweeney (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.uschamber.com/comment/letter-opposing-new-jersey-senate-bill-s-4204
(supporting the carve-outs).
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September 2019. 122 Initially, under ABS, if these workers submitted items
to one hiring entity more than thirty-five times per year, they would be tested
under the ABC test and classified as an employee. However, these workers
are now on the list of ABC test exemptions and will therefore be tested under
the Borello test. 123 And the initial thirty-five times per year submission
threshold was repealed by AB22S7. 124 Further, meetings between groups
representing freelancers of various professions and Assemblywoman Lorena
Gonzalez yielded additional amendments to ABS outside of the exemptions
that would "strike a balance and protect employment opportunities in these
professions ... [by] specify[ing] that a contractor cannot replace an
employee position." 125
Another industry that was initially disrupted by ABS was the music
industry. It is markedly freelanced and music professionals collaborate
throughout the year with different employers on one or more projects. 126
Once ABS was signed into law, the California music and performing arts
workers overwhelmingly said that the law was going to hurt their careers and
the industry as a whole. 127 In April 2020, California Assemblywoman
Lorena Gonzalez announced, that she had been working with individuals in
the music industry to understand ABS's impact on their profession. 128 As a
result, AB22S7 provided for an extensive list of carve-outs for the music
industry .129
ABS's initial carve-outs have been subsequently supplemented by those
in AB22S7 in an effort to accommodate workers in several industries. One
of the WCL's goals continues to be to clarify the business-to-business
122. See Greg Dool, CA Freelance Writers "Encouraged" By Latest AB 5
Development, FOLIO (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.foliomag.com/ab5-update-freelancewriters-encouraged-proposed-amendment-text/ (speaking to freelance writers who were
worried about the effects the original AB5 may have on their careers).
123. See infra Appendix A.
124. See Richard Reibstein, AB2257: Not Much Better Than AB5 for Most Industries
in California Using Independent Contractors, JD SUPRA (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://www .jdsupra.com/legalnews/ab2257-not-much-better-than-ab5-for-3 5040/.
125. See Dool, supra note 122.
126. Andrea Domanick, The Music Industry Gets Relief From California's AB5 Gig
Economy Law, KCRW MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.kcrw.com/music/
articles/musicians-ab-5-gig-economy-law.
127. See Makeda Easter, The AB5 Backlash: Singers, Actors, Dancers, Theaters
Sound Off on Freelance Law, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2020, 2:16 PM), https://
www .latimes.com/entertaimnent-arts/story/2020-02- l 2/how-ab5-is-impacting-califor
nia-readers-in-the-perfonning-arts.
128. See Press Release, Lorena Gonzalez, Lorena Gonzalez Announces Pending
Changes to How AB 5 Applies to the Music Industry (Apr. 17, 2020), https://
www.califomiansforthearts.org/ab-5-in-the-news/2020/4/ 17/lorena-gonzalez-announ
ces-changes-to-how-ab-5-applies-to-freelancer-writers-and-journalists.
129. See infra Appendix A.

68

AMERICAN UNWERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 11: 1

contracting relationships exemption and referral agency relationships
exemption. 130 Including the foregoing, there are 109 exemptions from the
ABC test in the WCL. 131 Accordingly, AB2257 does not simplify or clarify
a worker's classification but rather creates "rigid exemptions" with detailed
conditions. 132
While there are numerous exemptions, AB2257 fails to carve out
exemptions for the numerous independent contractors that are similarly
situated to those who have lobbied and achieved exemption but could not or
did not lobby. 133 This provides for disparity among certain workers and
makes one wonder if more carve-outs are or should be forthcoming.
Additionally, California truckers, movie and television employees, and appbased companies are notably excluded from the new exemptions. 134 Can the
WCL meet its goal of expanding employment under the ABC test when so

130. See Chris Micheli, AB 5 'Fix: ' New Exemptions Added to California's
Independent Contractor Law, CAL. GLOBE (Sept. 14, 2020, 2:20 PM),
https ://californiaglobe .com/section-2/ab-5-fix-new-exemptions-added-to-californiasindependent-contractor-law /.
131. See id.; see also infra Appendix A (providing a list of exemptions from AB5 and
AB2257).
132. See Reibstein, supra note 124 (discussing the shortcomings of both AB5 and
AB2257, specifically noting key deficiencies in AB2257's exemptions).
133. See id.
134. See Aaron H. Cole, AB 2257 Enacts Significant Changes to AB 5 on
Classification of Workers as Independent Contractors, NAT'L L. REV. (Oct. 13, 2020),
https ://www.natlawreview.com/article/ab-225 7 -enacts-significant-changes-to-ab-5-clas
sification-workers-independent; Micheli, supra note 130. For example, the trucking
industry expressed its dissatisfaction early on with the WCL 's ABC test (then AB5) by
bringing a series of suits in the California courts seeking exemption or preemption
through the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA").
People v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty, 57 Cal. App. 5th 619, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
(holding that the ABC test is not preempted by the F AAAA because it is a "generally
applicable employment law that does not prohibit the use of independent contractors, and
therefore does not have an impennissible effect on prices, routes, or services"); People
v. Cal Cartage Transp. Exp., LLC, No. BC689320, 2020 WL 497132, at* 10 (L.A. Super.
Ct. Jan. 8, 2020) (holding that "the ABC Test has an impennissible effect on motor
carriers' 'price[s], route[s], [and] service[s]' and is preempted by the FAAAA"); Cal.
Trucking Ass'n v. Becerra, 433 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (granting a
preliminary injunction based on trucker plaintiff's questions of whether AB 5 would be
preempted by F AAAA). The Ninth Circuit held that the application of AB5 to truckers
(motor carriers) is not preempted by the F AAAA, and therefore, truckers will be tested
under the WCL. Cal. Trucking Ass'n v. Bonta, 996 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2021). On June
21, 2021, the Ninth Circuit denied the California Trucking Association's petition for
rehearing en bane, but the Ninth Circuit did grant the Association's motion to stay the
issuance of the mandate so that the Association can file a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Cal. Trucking Ass'n v. Bonta, Nos. 20-55106, 20-55107, 2021 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18434 (9th Cir. June 21, 2021); Cal. Trucking Ass'n v. Bonta, Nos. 2055106, 20-55107, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 18752 (9th Cir. June 23, 2021).
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many occupations and industries are exempt from it and still tested under the
same test they've been tested under for over thirty years?
E. Prop 22 - Exempting Rideshare and Delivery App Drivers

ABS was painted as a law focused on correcting worker misclassification
in the gig economy, particularly for app-based drivers. As shown above, its
coverage extends well beyond what many consider the "gig economy,"
including those workers not involved in app-based companies. But some
app-based companies may no longer have to worry about California's WCL
(depending on future outcomes of constitutionality challenges), particularly
the large ones, thanks to Prop 22.
In October 2020, the California Court of Appeal held that Uber drivers
were employees under ABS .135 Uber, Lyft, and Doordash successfully added
Prop 22 to the November 2020 ballot. 136 Prop 22 asked California residents
to vote yes to define their "app-based transportation (rideshare) and delivery
drivers as independent contractors and adopt labor and wage policies specific
to app-based drivers and companies." 137 A "yes" vote meant that the WCL's
ABC test would not apply to their app-based drivers, rendering the result in
People v. Uber moot. 138 Conversely, a "no" vote would have meant that the
WCL would be used to decide whether app-based drivers were employees or
independent contractors and would have allowed the court decision to remain
applicable .139
Rideshare and delivery app companies invested $205 million 140 into
campaigns for the California voters to vote "yes" - that the WCL does not
apply to app-based drivers. 141 Prop 22 passed with 9,958,425 votes
(58.63%). 142 Therefore, so long as Prop 22 is upheld constitutionally, 143 the
135. See People v. Uber Tech., Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 266, 313-14 (Cal. Ct. App.
2020).
136. California Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor
Policies Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Califomia_Proposition
_22,_App-Based_Drivers_as_ Contractors_and_Labor_Policies_Initiative _(2020) (last
visited Jan. 12, 2022).
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Corporate supporters of Prop 22 were DoorDash, Instacart, Lyft, Postmates,
and Uber.
141. Id.; see also Meredith Whittaker, 'Those in Power Won't Give Up Willingly':
Veena Dubai and Meredith Whittaker on the Future of Organizing Under Prop 22,
ONEZERO (Nov. 5, 2020), https://onezero.medimn.com/prop-22-where-do-gig-workersgo-from-here-e6eaa3 ee23 24.
142. California Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor
Policies Initiative (2020), supra note 136.
143. See id. (outlining a constitutional challenge to Prop 22).

70

AMERICAN UNWERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 11: 1

WCL cannot be applied to rideshare and delivery app drivers - i.e., such
workers will be deemed independent contractors and cannot be considered
employees under the WCL. 144 Though Prop 22 bars the drivers from being
considered employees, thus disqualifying them from receiving all of the
protections that the WCL grants, it did require that they receive certain pay
and benefits, just not the level of protection they would receive if covered by
the WCL. 145 As such, the passing of Prop 22 is already causing a downward
spiral, exacerbating the disaggregation of employment. At least one
company in California is firing driver-employees in favor of using DoorDash
workers who are cheaper labor because they are independent contractors and
This causes unfair
now exempt from California employment laws. 146
competition and puts workers who were fired, so their employer could use
unprotected drivers, either on the unemployment line or partaking in appbased work with less protections and benefits than they were previously
entitled to. We can do better.
Part IV discusses experimental federalism and diffusion at the state level.
It also addresses the diffusion mechanisms, learning and imitation, and
applies the Galle and Leahy diffusion factors ofrelevancy, information, and
costs. Part IV then provides an analysis of the potential diffusion of the WCL
to other states.

144. See, e.g., Castellanos v. California, No. S266551, 2021 Cal. LEXIS 833 (Cal.
Feb. 3, 2021) (granting judicial notice). But see Castellanos v. California, No.
RG21088725, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 7285, at *18 (Super. Ct. Cal. Cnty. Alameda Aug.
20, 2021) (ruling that Prop 22 was unconstitutional because it "limits the power of the
future legislature to define app-based drivers as workers subject to workers'
compensation law"). Uber et al. are expected to appeal the ruling.
145. Under Prop 22, drivers are to be paid 120% of California's minimum wage. The
wages will be paid during times that drivers have a passenger in their vehicle. If a driver
works at least fifteen hours per week, they will be entitled to a health care stipend. Prop
22 also mandates that drivers receive safety training and entitlement to breaks if they
drive more than twelve hours in a twenty-four-hour period. Prop 22 also requires that
drivers be emolled in injury protection insurance. Both Uber and Lyft have responded
differently to these requirements. See Kim Lyons, Uber and Lyfl Roll Out New Benefits
for California Drivers under Prop 22, THE VERGE (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www .theverge.com/2020/12/14/2217 4600/uber-lyft-new-benefits-californiadrivers-prop-22-gig-economy. But see Veronica Irwin, Rideshare Drivers Report Being
Short Changed, SF WEEKLY (July 19, 2021), https://www.sfweekly.com/top
stories/rideshare-drivers-report-being-short-changed/ (discussing the amounts Lyft and
Uber collect from passengers' total payment to drivers).
146. "In California hundreds of Albertsons employees are being swapped for
DoorDash Inc. workers .... " Josh Eidelson, The Gig Economy is Coming for Millions
of American Jobs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 17, 2021, 4:00 AM),
https://www .bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-02-17/gig-economy-coming-for-mill
ions-of-u-s-jobs-after-california-s-uber-lyft-vote.
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IV. EXPERIMENT OR FREE-RIDE- WHAT TO DO?
"[T]he ability of states to serve as policy laboratories is a strength of
federalism. " 147

Experimental federalism is the process by which states serve as
laboratories and experiment with new policies and laws. 148 Through this
experimentation, states can share information that can lead to collective
learning, 149 yielding a better picture of what was effective .15 Consequently,
states can build on one another's successes and failures, "generat[ing] more
effective and efficient policy approaches." 151 Former President Bill Clinton
used Brandeis' term "laboratories of democracy" to describe how state
officials "learn from one another, borrowing, adapting, and improving on
each other's best efforts." 152
It is generally believed that state governments are more adept at creating
innovative laws or policies than the federal government because they are
more flexible and responsive to an ever-changing electorate. 153

°

147. Srinivas C. Parinandi, Policy Inventing and Borrowing among State
Legislatures, 64 AM. J. POL. Ser. 852, 866 (2020).
148. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279-80 (1932); Doni
Gewirtzman, Complex Experimental Federalism, 63 BUFFALO L. REV. 241, 242 (2015);
Symposium, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Future of Federalism: Federalism as a
Constitutional Concept, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 961, 973 (2017); Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 43031 (1998).
149. See Jenna Bednar, Nudging Federalism Towards Productive Experimentation,
21 REG'L & FED. STUDS. 503, 507-08 (2011). The collective learning can occur both
horizontally across states and vertically to the federal govermnent. See Myron T. Steele
& Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1365,
1369-70 (2014).
150. See J. William Futrell, Law of Sustainable Development, ENV'T. F., Mar.-Apr.
1994, at 16, 20 ("The prospects for early innovation and experimentation on the state
level are better than in Washington."); see also Steele & Tsoflias, supra note 149, at
1369-70.
151. Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1666 (2014);
see also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210, 1211-12 (1992).
152. ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES 145 (2010) (quoting Bill Clinton
in DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY xii (1990)).
153. See David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a New Look to our
"Laboratories of Democracy" In the Effort to Improve our Approach to Environmental
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 356 (1994); see also Paulette L. Stenzel, Right To Act:
Advancing the Common Interests ofLabor and Environmentalists, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1, 37
( 1993) ("Individual states can choose varying mechanisms as the tools for achieving their
goals. Then, those laws can be examined to see which options have proven to be the
most effective."); Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level:
Rethinking Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371,
371 (2008) (" [L ]ocal govermnents may prove even more fruitful agents for social change
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"[F]ederalism allows state governments, equipped with knowledge of their
unique and very different communities, to make better policy choices than a
'one size fits all' approach imposed by a national government." 154 Former
President George H.W. Bush referred to the movement of power and
decision-making to the states as being "closer to the people." 155 Similarly,
Ralph Nader has said, "Progressive groups and low and moderate income
families and minorities are often finding state legislatures - and city
councils - more responsive to their needs than the lawmakers in
Washington. " 156 In addition to states, other subnational governments such
as cities, localities, and Native American tribes also serve as laboratories and
innovators of change .157
and policy innovation than the state or federal levels of government."). Additionally,
tribes are also sovereigns and are well-placed to experiment. Elizabeth Ann Kronk
Warner, Justice Brandeis and Indian Country: Lessons from the Tribal Environmental
Laboratory, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 857, 857 (2015) ("[G]iven their unique connection to the
land and the intensified thread of some modem enviromnental challenges, many tribes
are already engaged in regulatory innovation related to enviromnental law.").
154. Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 256-57; see also Wallace E. Oates,An Essay on
Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120 (1999).
155. President George Herbert Walker Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29,
1991); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991); Brian Galle & Joseph
Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments,
58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1336 (2009); Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means
What It Says, 85 Tux. L. REV. 1, 21 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of
Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (2006); Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating
Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENV'T. L. REV. 293, 293 (2016). The federal
govermnent has encouraged and respected the States' ability to innovate through their
own lawmaking. An example lies in the "State Innovation Waivers" of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA"). State Relief and Empowennent
Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575 (Oct. 24, 2018) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 33 and 45
C.F.R. pt. 155). The U.S. Secretary ofHealthandHmnan Services and the Secretary of
the Treasury stated in guidance that they were "committed to empowering the states to
innovate in ways that will strengthen their health insurance markets, expand choices of
coverage, target public resources to those most in need, and meet the unique
circumstances of each state." Id. "States are better positioned than the federal
govermnent to assess and respond to the needs of their citizens with innovative solutions.
We encourage states to craft solutions that meet the needs of their consumers and markets
and innovate to the maximmn extent possible under the law." Id. at 53,577.
156. Ralph Nader, State Legislatures as "Laboratories of Democracy", COMMON
DREAMS (May 31, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20080924115109/http:/www.
commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=%2Fviews04%2F053 l-12.htm. Mr. Nader
also quotes Tim Mcfeeley, who was the Executive Director of the Center for Policy
Alternatives, as saying, "[t]oday, it is state legislators who are proposing the nation's
most far-reaching, proactive measures. They are making legislatures a testing ground
for the newest political debates. For progressives, the action is in the states." Id.
157. In seeking to protect app-based drivers, two cities recently enacted ordinances to
provide for minimum pay for app-based drivers. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAw No.
2018/150 (Aug. 14, 2018); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 126,189 (Sept. 29, 2020); see
also Kronk Warner, supra note 153, at 857; David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A
Market Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance,
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Subnational governments have not only been innovating m numerous
areas of the law by choice, 158 but also by force.
'When federal inaction creates a policy vacuum, state policy
experimentation may be the only available solution for solving difficult
social problems." 159 Inaction or ineffectual action at the federal level will
ideally prompt state policymakers to experiment and endeavor to create
optimal solutions. Accordingly, one would think that having fifty state
legislatures that are essentially potential "innovation centers" 160 should
provide opportunities to test a variety of approaches simultaneously or within
a short amount of time. 161 And this could be true if all or even a multitude
of states were willing to engage in experimentation. However, not all states
want, or have the resources, to experiment. Instead, these states may forgo
conducting their own experiments, opting to free-ride on an experimenting
state's law or a pre-existing common law test, leading to underexperimentation and information deficits. 162 Ultimately, free-riding can
result "in a sub-optimal level of experimentation," thereby reducing our
chances of achieving the best policy .163 Regardless, free riding occurs, and
because some states are more prone to being first-movers than others, a freeand the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523,
1587-88 (2014).
158. See Markell, supra note 153, at 355; see also Joel Eisen, Emily Hammond, Jim
Rossi, David Spence, Jacqueline Weaver, & Hannah Wiseman, Introduction: Themes in
Energy Law 1, 20 (Geo. Wash. Univ. L. School, Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper No. 201438, 2014).
159. Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 244; see KARCH, supra note 152, at 15 ("When
national lawmakers could not agree on legislation or did not address specific topics, state
officials sometimes developed innovated policy solutions on their own."); see also
Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy
Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. Ser. REV. 395 (1990).
160. While Professor Markell spoke specifically to enviromnental law innovation, his
comments equally resonate in the employment law setting. See David L. Markell, The
Federal Superfund Program:
Proposals for Strengthening the Federal/,5tate
Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENV'T. L. 1, 73 (1993).
161. See Markell, supra note 153, at 355; Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 243; see
also Rachael K. Hinkle & Michael J. Nelson, The Transmission of Legal Precedent
among State Supreme Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 16 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 391
(2016); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term - Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60-61 (1998); Benjamin K. Sovacool, The
Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on
Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENV'TL.J. 397, 434-36 (2008). But
see Daniel Treisman, THE ARCHITECTURE OF GOVERNMENT: RETHINKING POLITICAL
DECENTRALIZATION 229-35 (2007) (arguing that states acting as innovators does not
necessarily lead to innovation); Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Political
Decentralization and Policy Experimentation, 4 Q. J. POL. Ser. 35, 53 (2009) (noting that
experimentation and innovation are not a foregone conclusion).
162. Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 267.
163. Id. at 266.
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riding state has one to follow. 164 California is one such recognized firstmover.

A. California -A Recognized First-Mover
California is a proven "first-mover" state in many instances. 165 For
example, when former President Donald Trump announced that the United
States was withdrawing from the 2015 Paris Agreement, California cofounded a 15-state alliance committed to upholding the Agreement's
objectives. 166 Further, when California increased its minimum wage, many
states followed. 167
Gender diversity on public company boards is another example of
California being first. On September 30, 2018, California passed a law that
required public company boards to have a minimum number of women
directors .168 This policy diffused to Washington within eighteen months of
164. Some states are risk-seeking first movers or early adopters of innovative policies,
whereas some are more risk-averse or late adopters (which can be the free riders). See
id. at 270.
165. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate
Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 870 (2008)
(noting California as a first mover in the area of solar technology research); Lauren
Baron, How to Avoid Constitutional Challenges to State Based Climate Change
Initiatives: A Case Study of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey and New York
State Programs, 32 PACE ENV'T. L. REV. 564, 565 (2015) (noting California as a first
mover in reducing emissions from the transportation sector); Sharon B.
Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 885, 905 (2015) (recognizing California as a first mover in the energy and
enviromnental space by setting "a baseline calculation methodology for demand
response by regulation"); Spencer Keller, How Small Cannabis Businesses Can Survive
the Hurdles of IP Protection, 8 Tux. A&M L. REV. 199, 200 (2020) (finding California
as a first-mover because it gave doctors the option to recommend medicinal marijuana
to patients); Holning Lau, Human Rights and Globalization: Putting the Race to the Top
in Perspective, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 319,327 (2008) (observing California as
the first mover in same-sex marriage rights to non-residents); J. Haskell Murray, The
Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 558 (2016) (identifying California
as the first to depart from the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation and expressly
require dissenter's rights); Chiara Pappalardo, What a Difference a State Makes:
California's Authority to Regulate Motor Vehicle Emissions Under the Clean Air Act
and the Future of State Autonomy, 10 MICH. J. OF ENV'T. & ADMIN. L. 169, 169 (2021)
(noting California as a first mover and serving as a laboratory for the testing of
"technological solutions and regulatory approaches to improve air quality"); Catherine
Powell, We the People: These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2741
(2019) (mentioning that first mover states like California need to continue to lead in the
area of climate change mitigation).
166. Felix von Meyerinck, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, Markus Schmid, & Steven
Davidoff Soloman, As California Goes, So Goes the Nation? Board Gender Quotas and
the Legislation of Non-economic Values l, 20 (ECGI Finance Working Paper No.
785/2021, 2021 ), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3 303798.
167. Id. at 6, 21-22.
168. See CAL. CORP. CODE §2115.5 (West 2019); see also id. §301.3. California was
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California's adoption; Washington enacted a bill that requires either a
gender-diverse board or specific disclosures to shareholders essentially as to
why they did not meet the minimum number of women requirement. 169
While Norway was the true first to establish a corporate board quota, 170
California was the first-mover in the United States. 171
Many political science scholars have investigated and attempted to rank
which states are the most innovative and conducting more experiments. 172
Regardless of what methodology is used to rank the states, California has
consistently been on or near the top. 173
Probably every one of the fifty states can point to a few areas of law in
which it developed new doctrine accepted by other states. But California
has a record, probably unique in the number and subject-matter range, of
legal innovations - instituted by the Legislature and the courts alike that have broken new paths. 174

the first state to enact a law requiring gender-diversity. It was also the first state to act
when it comes to non-binding resolutions, having adopted theirs in 2013. S. Con. Res.
62, 2013 Leg., 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013). The non-binding resolution, which was
designed to encourage public company participation, diffused to other states: S. 1007,
2015 Leg., 189th Sess. (Mass. 2015); H.R. 0439, 2015 Leg., 99th Sess. (Ill. 2015); H.R.
273, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Pa. 2017); H.R.J. Res. 17-1017, 2017 Leg., 2017 Sess.
(Colo. 2017).
169. S. 6037, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). The Washington law requires
companies who do not meet the minimum requirements to provide a "board diversity
discussion and analysis" that discloses the company's approach to creating board
diversity. Id. Some answers that the company would provide in said discussion and
analysis would include: how the board "considered the representation of any diverse
groups in identifying and nominating" board candidates, or the reasons that diversity was
not considered; any policies adopted to identify and nominate members of any diverse
groups as board candidates, or the reasons for not adopting such a policy; and
"mechanisms of refresh[ing] the board, such as tenn limits and mandatory retirement"
of board members. Id.
170. See Darren Rosenblmn, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6
BERKLEY Bus. L.J. 55, 62-63 (2009); see also, Gwladys Fouche, Exclusive: Norway
Wealth Fund Tells Firms: Put More Women on Your Boards, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2021,
5:56 AM), https ://www .reuters.com/article/us-norway-swf-exclusive/exclusive-norwaywealth-fund-tells-finns-put-more-women-on-your-boards-idUSKBN2AF0TX
("Norway's $1.3 trillion sovereign wealth fund, the world's largest, wants the companies
it invests in globally to boost the number of women on their boards and to consider setting
targets if fewer than 30% of their directors are female ....").
171. See Darren Rosenblum, California Dreaming?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2019)
(arguing that California's board diversity law may actually be successful and encourage
other states to act).
172. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 4.
173. See id. at 883. But see Robert L. Savage, Policy Innovativeness as a Trait of
American States, 40 J. POLITICS 212, 212 (1978) ("American political folklore is rich in
suggesting that some states are innovators while others are laggards.").
174. Harry N. Scheiber, California - Laboratory of Legal Innovation, 11
EXPERIENCE 4, 5 (2001).
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What motivates California and other states to innovate or experiment?
Other than simply trying to come up with the best solution to a problem,
policy evangelism is posited as a reason that a state may be motivated to be
more innovative. Elected officials are likely to "evangelize - to want to see
their own ideas of the 'best' outcome enacted not only for themselves, but
everywhere" 175 - because they believe they have the best idea how to tackle
a problem - that their innovation improves society and should be as widely
implemented as possible. 176 Additionally, politicians may be seeking
nationwide attention and notoriety .177 Aside from political reasons, higher
levels of state innovation can be attributable to the availability of financial
resources, 178 a larger population - particularly those residing in urban areas,
and a higher percentage of the population being college graduates. 179
Not all states have the financial resources to experiment. "In a world
where states have scarce resources, piggybacking on the efforts and insights
of [others] seems sensible and even economically desirable. " 180 State policy
innovation and experimentation is risky and costly. 181 As such, states with
more financial resources are more likely to experiment. 182 "More populous

175. Galle & Leally, supra note 155, at 1356; see also Steven Kelman, Why Public
Ideas Matter, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 31, 46 (Robert B. Reich ed., 1988)
(reporting surveys of officials).
176. Galle & Leally, supra note 155, at 1363; see Cai & Treisman, supra note 161, at
53.
177. See Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 268; see also Heather K. Gerken & Ari
Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57
(2014); Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1386-89.
178. See Thad Kousser, TERM LIMITS AND DISMANTLING OF THE LEGISLATIVE
PROFESSIONALISM 177-79 (2005); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms
of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. Ser. 840, 843 (Oct. 2008) ("Innovative leaders were
found to be larger, wealthier and more cosmopolitan."); see also Robert L. Crain,
Fluoridation: Diffusion of an Innovation among Cities, 44 SOCIAL FORCES 467, 472
(1966); Fred W. Grupp, Jr. & Alan R. Richards, Variations in Elite Perceptions of
American States as Referents for Public Policy Making, 69 AM. POL. Ser. REV. 850, 851
(1975); Walker, supra note 4, at 880.
179. See Andrew Karch, Sean C. Nicholson-Crotty, Neal D. Woods, & Ann O'M.
Bowman, Policy Diffusion and the Pro-innovation Bias, 69 POL. RSCH. Q., Apr. 2016, at
83, 86.
180. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PENN. L. REV.
703, 730 (2016). Dodson's focus was on piggybacking on federal laws, but the premise
is equally applicable to states.
181. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1342; see also Susan Rose-Ackennan,
Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
593, 594 (1980).
182. See Karch, Nicholdson-Crotty, Woods & Bowman, supra note 179, at 83 (2016);
Boehmke & Skinner, supra note 4, at 303; Gray, supra note 4, at 1174; Walker, supra
note 4, at 880; see also Dodson, supra note 180, at 732; John B. Oakley & Arthur F.
Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1426 (1986).
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states with ample resources are better able to absorb the costs of
experimen[tation] in one or two budget areas and can more easily diversify
against the risk of failure." 183 As the fifth-largest economy in the world,
California is well poised to experiment and provide solutions to big
problems. 184
B. Diffusion Mechanisms

"Diffusion is the process by which an innovation spreads." 185 It transpires
when state policymakers observe other states and implement the same
solution. 186 Said another way, while some states serve as laboratories and
experiment with new policies and laws, policymakers in states that are less
likely to experiment can free-ride on an experimenting state's law.
Some state legislatures will immediately adopt another state's law because
they want to imitate that state. Others will seek to learn from the firstmoving state's experiment's results. Regardless, the decision to free-ride
does not come easily. While political science scholars focus on four main
mechanisms or ways that a policy or law can spread from one state to
another: imitation, learning, economic competition, and coercion, 187 this
Article focuses on the imitation and learning mechanisms because they are
the most applicable here.

i.

Mechanism: Imitation

Imitation as a mechanism focuses directly on emulating another state. 188
States that imitate often hope to "raise their profile and make them[selves]
more attractive places to live," 189 like the state they are choosing to emulate.

183. Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1367 (citing Ken Kollman et al.,
Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 102, 102
(2000)); see also Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase
Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 231 (2002).
184. See Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Innovation and Diffusion Models
in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 169, 170, 176-77 (Paul A.
Sabatier ed., 1999); Volden, supra note 1, at 301, 304; Shipan & Volden, supra note 178,
at 843 (stating how large states are the primary sources of innovation).
185. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 13 (1962).
186. GRAEME BOUSHEY, POLICY DIFFUSION DYNAMICS IN AMERICA 26 (2010).
187. See Shipan & Volden, supra note 178, at 840. "Economic diffusion forces occur
on policies that involve competition between states over residents, payments, or
revenues. Such competition is usually most acute between states with common borders
because this facilitates less costly movement by individuals or capital across borders."
Boehmke & Skinner, supra note 4, at 320.
188. Shipan& Volden, supra note 178, at 842.
189. Id. at 843; see also KARCH, supra note 152, at 148; Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter
W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 147, 149 (1983).
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Another way that imitation can fuel diffusion is through homogeneity or
institutional isomorphism. 190 In other words, states that are homogeneous
(resemble one another) are likely to imitate a state they are similar to by
adopting its policy.
While imitation often occurs based on close
geographical proximity, the similarity can go beyond pure geography. For
instance, states that are ideologically or politically homogenous are more
likely to adopt one another's laws through imitation. 191
A free-riding imitating state trusts, or seeks to emulate, the experimenting
state regardless of the experiment's outcome. 192 For some policymakers, the
decision to imitate can be based in saving resources, luring new residents to
their state, or alternatively, preventing the loss of their current residents to
the experimenting state. Perhaps they want to appear united with the firstmoving experimenting state. 193 Or perhaps the policy is one that most states
can agree on, such as sex offender registries or the AMBER Alert system. 194
There could be numerous reasons that policymakers may find it valuable to
imitate. However, there are drawbacks to imitation. Problematically, when
policymakers imitate, they may not consider the unique preferences of their
residents, 195 thus creating asymmetry between state law and the electorate. 196
Another problem is that free-riding imitating states are unlikely to undertake
the investigations or develop and maintain the records commonly associated
with experimentation, such as the debates and legislative or rulemaking
history that courts use when interpreting the law. 197
If a state policymaker' s impulse is to emulate a specific state, imitation as
a process takes virtually no time at all. It can be essentially immediate. For
example, recall Washington's adoption of California's gender-diverse board
quota law within eighteen months. 198 While the Washington law's language
is not verbatim, it is very similar and can still be considered as having
imitated California's as it is common for a state to customize a law to fit its

190. KARCH, supra note 152, at 148; DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 189, at 149.
191. Daniel M. Butler, Craig Volden, Adam M. Dynes, & Boris Shor, Ideology,
Learning, and Policy Diffusion: Experimental Evidence, 61 AM. J. POL. Ser. 37, 37
(2017); see also BOUSHEY, supra note 186, at 25 ("Rather than taking a comprehensive
solution search for each ... problem, govermnents borrow heavily from their neighbors
or ideological peers."); Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 293 (describing the idea of
"homophily").
192. See Dodson, supra note 180, at 730 ("It is cognitively easier and simpler for
states to follow a trodden path ... than to blaze a new trail.").
193. Id. at 736.
194. BOUSHEY, supra note 186, at 1.
195. See Dodson, supra note 180, at 747.
196. Id. at 706.
197. Id. at 730.
198. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction. 199 Imitative adoption can happen quickly because there is no
experimentation to wait for.
Lastly, consider the American proverb, "where California goes, so goes
the nation" and how it applies to the imitation mechanism.2° 0 "California has
often been a leader in introducing new regulation, which is subsequently
adopted by other states."201 As a matter of fact, California is a known
bellwether in environmental, labor, privacy, and other causes. 202 Some states
may want to imitate California because of its large economy, population, and
innovative reputation, particularly in the labor law space. Are those
attributes enough to promote adoption of the WCL by other states, or would
other state policymakers prefer to learn from California's experiment first?

ii.

Mechanism: Learning

When states experiment with different policies, they can provide results
of success and failure that other states can learn from.2° 3 It is just as
important to observe and analyze unsuccessful state laws and programs as it
is the successful ones. The learning mechanism inherent in this scrutiny is
crucial to a state's decision on whether and when to adopt others' laws. 204
'When confronted with a problem, decision makers simplify the task of
finding a solution by choosing an alternative that has proven successful
elsewhere. " 205 As such, learning as a diffusion mechanism depends upon the
success, or perhaps the perceived success, of a policy or law. If a state's
policymakers determine or perceive that the experimenting state's legal
199. KARCH, supra note 152, at 149. Perhaps Washington's changes to California's
law helps to achieve a more optimal solution. See Dodson, supra note 180, at 746 ("For
those convinced by the virtues of homogeneity, allowing temporary, controlled, and
collaborative variation may help achieve unifonnity in a better form."). One can
certainly view California's carve-outs as modifications to a statute it adopted. See
KARCH, supra note 152, at 149.
200. Meyerinck, Niessen-Ruenzi, Schmid, & Solomon, supra note 166, at 19 (stating
that California led the nation in board gender quotas through imitation mechanism).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 20-22.
203. Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at266 (noting that some states choose to do nothing
and wait while other states undertake risky experiments that will produce information
and results); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1464---67 (2011).
204. Markell, supra note 153, at 355-56, 355 n.23; see also Daniel A. Farber,
Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 801
(1994); Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1354.
205. William D. Berry & Brady Baybeck, Using Geographic Information Systems to
Study Interstate Competition, 99 AM. POL. Ser. REV. 505, 505 (2005); see Shipan &
Volden, supra note 178, at 841; see also Boehmke & Skinner, supra note 4, at 320
("Social learning describes a process whereby states look to the policies of other states,
whether as a solution to a common problem or merely as a way to keep up with their
peers.").
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experiment was a success, they are more likely to adopt it. 206 While this
makes sense in a vacuum, policymakers do not operate in such a space. State
policymakers who are ideologically or politically against certain policies
may be reluctant or unwilling to learn due to their own biases.2° 7 Therefore,
even if a law or policy is statistically beneficial, politics may prevent it from
diffusing.
Leaming as a process takes time. Allowing states to implement policy
more gradually allows for feedback and improved institutional leaming.2° 8
State policymakers that are interested in knowing the political, economic,
and overall consequences of a new law may take months if not years to
observe and evaluate the law's effectiveness. 209 This is one way that learning
is contrasted with imitation. A state that utilizes the learning process
patiently awaits the experiment's results. A state that utilizes the imitation
process is not interested in waiting for results but is primarily interested in
hopping on the bandwagon. 210
In learning, policymakers focus on the policy itself - how was it adopted,
was it effective, what were its political consequences? In contrast,
imitation involves a focus on the other government - what did that
government do and how can we appear to be the same? The crucial
distinction is that learning focuses on the action ... while imitation
focuses on the actor. 211

206. Shipan & Volden, supra note 178, at 842. It is often difficult to compute the
success of a policy or law. Sometimes shortcuts that are consistent with learning occur.
By way of example, "policymakers may interpret the broad adoption of a policy without
subsequent abandomnent over time as evidence of the success of the policy, or at least
as evidence of maintained political support." Id.; see also Gewirtzman, supra note 148,
at 271.
207. See Butler, Volden, Dynes, & Shor, supra note 191, at 38-39.
208. Steele & Tsoflias, supra note 149, at 1369-70.
209. Shipan& Volden, supra note 178, at 844.
210. See B0USHEY, supra note 186, at 2 ("Although the Amber Alert was exceptional
in the sheer speed and scope of its implementation, such abrupt patterns of policy
adoption are far from unique in American politics. The reenactment of the death penalty,
prohibition, term limits, tax revolts, state auto lemon laws, English Only language
legislation, 'three strikes' sentencing guidelines, mandatory child auto-restraint
requirements, and sex-offender registries stand as prominent examples of policy
innovations that moved rapidly and extensively throughout the nation. Most of these
innovations were championed by well-organized interest groups, and appealed broadly
to voters across the states. In many cases, the innovation was adopted by more than 30
states in fewer than six years.").
211. Shipan & Volden, supra note 178, at 842-43 ("[A] classic example of learning
is avoiding touching the hot burner after observing someone doing so with bad effects,
whereas imitation is jmnping off the garage roof after observing your older brother doing
so, without regard for the consequences. In the fonner case, it is the action that matters;
in the latter, the actor. In the fonner, you learn about consequences; in the latter you
simply aspire to be like the other actor.").
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Brandeis recognized that when a state experiments, risk is minimized
because if such an experiment fails, the damage is confined to that single
state. 212 This of course assumes that the policy or law does not diffuse
rapidly via imitation.2 13 If states adopt laws before the results are in, as is
often the case with imitation, then Brandeis' hypothesis is not as confined.
Conversely, if a state innovation provides a successful outcome, it should
lead to diffusion of innovation among states.
Some state policymakers openly admit to waiting for the ABS experiment
to run its course before deciding whether to adopt it or a similar ABS-esque
statute.2 14
C. Policymakers Seek to Learn the Experiment's Results
Before Free-Riding
"[T]here 's an incentive for everyone [in New York] that comes up with a
proposal that avoids the pitfalls in California - that means we don't have
[ aJ daily running list of ... exemptions or lawsuits. " 215

Since California created ABS, states that are seeking to codify a new
worker classification law are watching and waiting for the experiment's
results. This spectating exemplifies the learning mechanism of diffusion.2 16
Illinois legislator Will Guzzardi openly admits to learning before freeriding on ABS: 217 'When we're not the first state to act, we get to reflect on
the lessons of other states." 218 As of January 2020, his plan was to introduce
legislation similar to ABS, but not until he spoke with labor advocates and

212. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Dodson, supra note 180, at 746; Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at
243; JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 31 (2009);
Bednar, supra note 150; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251,276 (1977).
213. See infra Part IV.B.i.
214. See infra Part IV.D.
215. Anna Gronewold, Motive for Cuomo 's Gig Economy Task Force Leaves Some
Confused, POLITICO (Jan. 22, 2020, 7:15 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york
/ alb any /story /2020/01/22/motive-for-cuomos-gig-economy-task-force-leaves-some-con
fused-1253683 (quoting Staten Island Sen. Diane Savino). It can also lead to more
experimentation if a state decides against adoption.
216. See supra Part IV.B.ii. Spectating can also lead to more experimentation if a
state decides against adoption.
217. Mr. Guzzardi's comments were made prior to AB5's clarifying AB2257
enactment, but, presumably, his comments are applicable to the WCL and not just the
initial iteration via AB5.
218. Eli Rosenberg, Gig Economy Bills Move Forward in Other Blue States, After
California Clears the Way, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/business/2020/01/ 17/gig-economy-bills-move-forward-other-blue-states-after
-california-clears-way/.
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workers. 219 In speaking to Eli Rosenberg of the Washington Post,
Representative Guzzardi did not commit to an AB5-esque bill, stating it
could be like ABS or maybe the bill would create a new class of worker. 220
As such, he is now waiting to see how California's ABS experiment goes.
New Jersey passed several laws in 2019 to crack down on worker
misclassification. 221 As of this writing, New Jersey bill S863 was proposed
by Senator Stephen M. Sweeney. 222 Bill S863 would modify New Jersey's
ABC test to mimic the version that California uses, as well as broaden its
scope. 223 New Jersey uses the ABC test solely for unemployment
compensation purposes. 224 If passed, the new law will modify the ABC test
to mimic AB5's coverage and expand its application to wage and hour laws,
wage payment laws, and wage collection laws in alignment with the New
Jersey Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC. 225
However, the legislation does not contain as long of a list of carve-outs,
which has been cause for criticism by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 226 In
November 2019, Sean Redmond, Executive Director, Labor Policy, penned:
[B]ecause lawmakers in California realized just how sweeping it was,
A.B. 5 also included numerous exemptions for employers in certain
industries, something that [this bill] fails to do. Moreover, after passing it
barely two months ago, the California legislature already realizes that it
may need to further amend A.B. 5 in its upcoming session to address the
predictably ill effects of the bill. 227
Redmond also called for further discussions with Sweeney relative to
exempting types of workers from the bill. 228 Clarifying what he thinks about
the gig economy, Redmond elaborated: "[E]xemptions must also include
legitimate independent contractors working for app-based platforms who

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Ryan T. Warden, New Jersey Resumes Efforts to Amend ABC Test for
Independent Contractor Status, Passes Slate ofLaws Targeting Misclassification, NAT'L

L. REV. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-resumesefforts-to-amend-abc-test-independent-contractor-status-passes (outlining the proposed
legislation).
222. S. 863, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
223. See id.
224. See Gronewold, supra note 215.
225. 106 A.3d 449 (2015) (expanding the coverage of the ABC test beyond
unemployment to purposes of resolving a wage-payment or wage-and-hour claim.); see
Warden, supra note 221.
226. Letter from SeanP. Redmond, supra note 121.
227. Id.
228. See id. ("To the extent that there may have been discussions about exempting
many types of workers from S. 4204, the U.S. Chamber is supportive of these
discussions.").
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provide their services while exercising a great deal of independence." 229
New York is also on the move. In 2019, numerous workplace protections
were put into place. 230 More on point to this Article, in the summer of 2019,
a bill to create a new "dependent worker" classification was submitted;
however, the bill has languished in committee for over a year and a half. 231
California's adoption of ABS may have provided more momentum for New
York's leaders evidenced by bill sponsors considering bills more like
AB5.2 32
While many New Yorkers appreciate the innovation and services offered
by a developing app-based economy, their fellow workers are unable to reap
these benefits because the law is not aligned with existing economic and
229. Id. The question of independence leads back to control and whether app-based
workers have sufficient independence to be classified as independent contractors. In
Lowman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 235 A.3d 278 (Pa. 2020),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an Uber driver was not free from Uber's
control and therefore was not self-employed. Id. at 281. The court did a lengthy analysis
of all of the ways that Uber does and does not control its drivers. See id. at 295-308.
230. N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 652 (McKinney 2021) (minimum wage increase); A.B. 10636,
2017-2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (tip credit increase); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW
§ 205 (McKinney 2021) (amending the workers' compensation law to provide benefits
for paid family leave); S.B. 6577 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (N,Y. 2019) (strengthening and
refonning the state's anti-harassment and anti-discrimination laws); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 194 (McKinney 2021) (expanding pay equity protection for employees beyond genderbased pay differentials); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE§ 8-107 (2016) (prohibiting employers
from conducting pre-employment drug testing for marijuana; prohibiting employment
discrimination based on an individual's reproductive health choices); AB. 2006 20192020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (amendment making discrimination based on gender
identity of expression unlawful); N .Y. EXEC. LAw § 292 (McKinney 2021) (prohibiting
discrimination based on traits historically associated with race, including hair texture and
protective hairstyles, such as braids, locks, and twists); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(McKinney 2021) (prohibits employers from taking discriminatory action against an
employee for wearing clothing, attire or facial hair associated with the requirements of
the employee's religion; amendment requiring employers to provide reasonable time off
to allow employees who are domestic violence victims to participate in legal proceedings
related to the offense or to obtain health or safety services); N.Y. ELEC. LAW§ 3-110
(McKinney 2020) (revised election law to provide workers expanded time off to vote);
A.B. 5501 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (prohibits an employer from threatening to
contact immigration authorities about an employee or an employee's family member);
WESTCHESTER CNTY., N.Y. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 586.04 (2022) (provides paid safe
time leave to employees who are the victims of domestic violence or hmnan trafficking).
231. S.B. 6583, 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/
legislation/bills/2019/s6538 (showing the current status of the bill).
232. Annie McDonough, Will New York Follow California on Gig Worker
Protections?, CITY & STATE N.Y. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.cityandstateny.com/
articles/policy/technology/california-passed-ab5-what-does-mean-new-york.html
("'California does what they want,' Savino said. 'Sometimes California and New York
are on the same page, and sometimes they're in totally different places. I think New
York is going to have the most comprehensive conversation about it. My goal is for us
to put forward the best piece oflegislation that becomes a model for the nation, regardless
of what happens anywhere else."').
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social changes. This asymmetry enables corporations to circumvent what
would be considered fair pay and benefits in an app-based economy, thereby
Former
sacrificing the employee and taxpayer for increased profits. 233
Governor Cuomo is quoted as having said about ABS: "I don't want to lag
California in anything, I don't want to lag any other state." 234 In what could
have been a step further, New York Senator John Liu considered a bill that
is similar to ABS .2 35 He has said: "'You know what, California, they are the
first, and sometimes it's good to be the second,' he added. 'We'll figure out
what has worked there, and we have the benefit of learning from someone
with a little bit of experience.' " 236
Clearly, policymakers are watching California's ABS and its aftermath to
learn from California's experiment. 237 Will states adopt a similar approach?
What do policymakers need to consider?

D. Applying the Galle and Leahy Diffusion Factors
Policymakers who seek to learn from another state's experiment require
focus and guidance to complete their learning process. As stated previously,
some policymakers seek to get their name out and evangelize. 238 But while
political aspirations and views surely impact decisions to adopt another
state's laws, 239 policymakers should look beyond politics and biases to
consider laws more objectively, or at a minimum consider their political
agenda within a certain scope of factors. More specifically, Professors Galle
and Leahy outline three factors that policymakers can weigh when deciding
whether to free-ride: "relevancy, information, and costs." 240 Said another
way, these factors can help determine whether a policy or law will likely
diffuse to another state.

i.

Relevancy

The relevancy factor addresses whether a policy is useful (or applicable)

233. ANDREW CUOMO, NEW YORK STATE: 2020 STATE OF THE STATE 101 (2020),
https ://www.govemor.ny.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2020 Stateofthe StateBook. p
df.
234. McDonough, supra note 232.
235. Gronewold, supra note 215.
236. Id. New York uses a version of the ABC test for purposes of workers in the
construction industry. N.Y. LAB. L. § 861-c(2) (McKinney 2022); see In re Barrier
Window Systems, Inc., 53 N.Y.S. 222,226 (App. Div. 2017).
237. Note also that the U.S. Congress is considering the ABC test part of AB5 for use
in detennining classification for NLRA purposes under the PRO Act.
238. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
240. Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1346.
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to another state.2 41 Relevancy is positively related to diffusion. Conversely,
if a policy is not relevant to another state, it is negatively related to diffusion.
Therefore, diffusion is likely to happen in cases where states are
homogeneous with regard to institutional structures, physical resources, and
demographics because similar states' laws will be pertinent. 242 States often
tailor their policies or laws to their unique characteristics. 243 As such there is
a reduced likelihood of diffusion of the tailored policy or law to a state that
is heterogeneous to the creating state. 244
In applying the relevancy factor to potential diffusion of the WCL,
policymakers should look beyond the scope of worker classification as a
general proposition. Properly classifying workers is relevant to all states;
however, the focus should be on the relevancy of the statutory language
itself California's WCL could very well fail to diffuse due to the underinclusiveness created by the extensive number of carve-outs and retained use
of the Borello test. 245 Potential free-riders may view the WCL as being too
customized or tailored to California, and therefore not relevant to their own
state. If that is so, relevancy will be lacking, which disfavors diffusion.
Conversely, it is possible that portions of California's approach will seem
relevant enough for policymakers to consider adoption with some
customization, which would favor diffusion.

ii.

Information

The information factor addresses the ease of obtaining useful data from
the first-mover state - whether such state will share information resulting
from its experiment. 246 "[G]ood information may often prove elusive.
Innovators rarely have incentives to generate their own information, other
actors may have limited knowledge about the most useful aspects of an
241. Id. at 1347; see also Robert L. Savage, When a Policy's Time Has Come: Cases
of Rapid Policy Diffusion, 1983-1984, 15 PuBLIUS 111, 114 (1985) (stating that
sometimes States emulate a policy on the basis of its virtue and adopt it regardless of
whether there is a need).
242. Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1347; Savage, supra note 241, at 114; see
Volden, supra note 1, at 295; see also Sharun W. Mukand & Dani Rodrik, In Search of
the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation and Economic Performance
(John F. Kennedy Sch. Of Gov't, Harv. U., Faculty Rsch. Working Papers Series,
Working Paper No. RWP02-027, 2002), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=329901.
243. See KARCH, supra note 152, at 149.
244. Id.
245. Consider the Department of Labor's comment in declining to adopt the ABC test
to be used for FLSA purposes: "The fact that California recently enacted numerous
exemptions to the ABC test highlights the test's limitations .... " Independent
Contractor Status Under Fair Labor Standards Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,600, 60,636
(proposed Sept. 25, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 780, 788, 795).
246. Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1351.
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experiment, and innovating jurisdictions may actually actively conceal
information about their activities from outsiders." 247 Information availability
(like an experiment's results) is positively related to diffusion. 248 Some
scholars note that first-movers may be more forthright about sharing positive
information about success than negative information indicating failure.2 49
Such outcome information is important for diffusion, but it may not be
readily available or even measured unless the first-mover state benefits from
it.250
Policymakers considering the adoption of the WCL can learn from the
successes and failures associated with the ABS experiment so long as the
information is available to them. When analyzing whether obtaining
information from the ABS experiment will be easy, states can look to various
sources. The first source should be California itself as it is in the best position
to provide the results from this experiment. 251 However, will California be
forthcoming with the data other states need? Does it benefit California to
provide such information? While this information may not come from the
state agencies directly, it could come from academic institutions or
organizations within California such as the UC Berkeley Labor Center ("the
Center"). 252 Professors from the Center research and report on a variety of
labor issues including app-based work and independent contracting. 253 The
Center's reports could be helpful to policymakers.

247. Id.; see Rose-Ackennan, supra note 181, at 611 ("[I]finnovations take time for
other states to copy, [the first mover state] expects some net immigration of voters from
other communities. Their immigration lowers tax bills and induces more migration.").
Some States may deliberately choose to withhold infonnation to prevent other states
from free-riding. This is problematic in that it "deprives the system of critical data that
could help other states or the federal govenunent identify the best available policy
solution." Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 267.
248. See ROGERS, supra note 185, at 16 ("The easier it is for individuals to see the
results of an innovation, the more likely they are to adopt."); David Lazer, Information
and Innovation in a Networked World, in DYNAMIC SOCIAL NETWORK MODELING AND
ANALYSIS: WORK.SHOP SUMMARY AND PAPERS 101 (Ronald Breiger, Kathleen Carley &
Philippa Pattison, eds. 2003) (stating technology has made infonnation gathering easier
and cheaper which in tum makes it easier for states to free ride).
249. Galle & Leahy, supra note, 155, at 1354; Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908,
1927-39 (1998); see also Christopher Hood, The Risk Game and the Blame Game, 37
Gov'T & OPPOSITION 15, 33 (2002).
250. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1353.
251. But see Wiseman, supra note 151, at 1164 (noting states do not always produce
accurate or enough information about their experiments).
252. UC Berkeley Labor Center:
About Us, U.C. BERKLEY LAB. CTR.,
https ://laborcenter.berkeley .edu/about/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
253. E.g., Annette Bernhardt & Sarah Thomason, What Do We Know About Gig Work
in California? An Analysis ofIndependent Contracting, UC BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (June
14,
2017),
https ://laborcenter.berkeley .edu/what-do-we-know-about-gig-work-in-
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Depending on the heterogeneity of the states involved, policy goals will
vary, and therefore the information state policymakers will gather and
analyze will vary. 254
[V]ariations in the types of information that states produce can make it
difficult to compare the effectiveness of policies from different states, or
to aggregate information about policies implemented in multiple
states . [P]referential differences can also make it more likely that a state
will discount or ignore useful information from other states based on
mistrust of its sources. 255
Policymakers in states that have different goals and values than
California's when it comes to worker protections may therefore mistrust
California's data or discount it altogether. Their own ideological or political
biases can get in the way of analyzing the data accurately.
The private sector - such as companies, interest groups, academics, and
policy entrepreneurs - provide information as well, particularly when it
comes to nationalized hot issues such as worker classification.2 56 But
policymakers should be cautioned. Many of the private sector groups are not
without motives that can skew data. For example, Uber has publicly
provided driver compensation data, but Uber is an interested party, so
policymakers should be careful how they read the data and should make
efforts to determine its credibility or replicate it when possible .2 57 And while
organizations and academics can generally be considered neutral
researchers, free of conflicts of interest, policymakers should look at whether
the research is funded by interested companies and take that into
consideration.
Lawsuits emanating from ABS or the WCL can also provide valuable
information to policymakers that are considering adoption. Similarly, the
public's reaction obtained via the media and social media can also be
invaluable.258 California's ABS stirred up a monumental amount of
califomia/.
254. Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 274.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 288-89. Such groups can be considered "the primary providers of interstate
linkages, facilitating the transfer of infonnation about policy experiments across state
borders and coordinating multi-state political efforts at policy innovation." Id.; see
BOUSHEY, supra note 186, at 29-30; Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking as a Federalism Case
Study, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1123, 1126-29 (2014); Michael Mintrom, Policy
Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion ofInnovation, 41 AM. J. POL. Ser. 738, 739-41 (1997).
257. Uber Drive: How Much Drivers Make, UBER, https://www.uber.com/
us/en/drive/how-much-drivers-make/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
258. See, e.g., Scott Rodd, Uber, Lyfl, Postmates Refuse to Comply With California
Gig Economy Law, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793142903/ascalifomia-tries-to-make-contract-workers-employees-industries-push-back (showing
the media's representation of how the public feels about AB5 lawsuits); Twitter: #AB5,
https://twitter.com/search?q=ab5&src=typed_query (last visited July 24, 2021) (showing
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controversy. Prop 22 added fuel to the media reactions and created greater
national awareness. 259 Free-riding states have been able to sit back and
watch the media reaction unfold. Potential free-riders, in deciding whether
to adopt the WCL, could find it helpful to gather data from the explosion of
social media attention ABS received. However, policymakers should exude
caution in that some individuals are more vocal than others, particularly
those that are solicited by lobbying groups. Other individuals may not be as
forthcoming with their preferences or opinions.
Ultimately, policymakers may determine that it is too difficult to obtain
information or at least information that is transferrable to their state's
interests. The lack of ease of obtaining information or information they trust
If, however, policymakers perceive obtaining
disfavors diffusion.
information as easy, then that could favor diffusion but only if the
information is considered favorable.
iii.

Costs

The last factor addresses the costs of adoption. Conservation of resources,
particularly for resource strained states, is a priority, but "[i]f the costs of
copying are comparable to, or even higher than, the costs of experiment, the
jurisdiction might as well experiment. " 26 Costs likely incurred in the
diffusion process are associated with adoption, implementation, and
enforcement. If putting the infrastructure in place is too complex and
therefore costly, the policy is less likely to be adopted. 261 Moreover, costs
pose an issue for free-riders who may not be able to afford them or evaluate
their credibility. Therefore, high costs and complexity are negatively related
to diffusion.
California's WCL is particularly complex and likely costly to administer,
particularly when considering enforcement and education. It has been too
responsive to pushback, risking chaos and disintegration - a sub-optimal
result. 262 California has seen the chaos and disintegration first-hand, but
perhaps the disintegration can be viewed as somewhat minimized by the
WCL's use of the Borello test as a default for the carve-outs. 263 Other states

°

the public's reaction on Twitter, one of the most used social media sites).
259. E.g., Tim Ryan, Lyfl, Uber Say Classification Rulings Can't Stand After Prop
22, LAW360 (Nov. 9, 2021, 9:29 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/l327367/lyftuber-say-classification-mlings-can-t-stand-after-prop-22.
260. Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1357. In fact, being true to experimental
federalism, we want and need more experimentation to achieve the best policies.
261. See Rogers, supra note 185, at 252.
262. Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 253; see also Dorri Gewirtzman, Lower Court
Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U.
L. REV. 457, 508 (2012).
263. See Powell, supra note 82, at 481-82 (finding that following California's
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may not have or want to maintain a pre-existing default test, and the costs
associated with such are likely prohibitive. Additionally, some state
legislatures may not have the resources (monetary and human time) to spend
on carving out exceptions like California continues to do. One of the reasons
policymakers prefer to free-ride is to save time and money. Revisiting or
amending a law regularly would be costly.2 64 As such, it is possible that
potential free-rider states will consider the costs of adopting, implementing,
and enforcing ABS as insurmountable.
E. Analyzing the Potential Diffusion of California's WCL

"[S]tates with successful policies are more likely to be emulated than are
those with failing policies. "265

Applying the Galle and Leahy diffusion factors: relevancy, information,
and costs, it is questionable whether policymakers will decide that the WCL
is relevant enough, that the data about the WCL's successes and failures is
credible and readily obtainable, and that the costs justify the adoption of the
W CL. 266 After application of the three factors, policymakers will want to
consider the successes and failures of the WCL before making the decision
of whether to adopt it.
Circling back to experimental federalism and laboratories of democracy:
States "can learn more when multiple governments try the policy, and even
more when such policies affect larger segments of society."267 California's
overall population is large, as is its independent contractor population.2 68
Given that the WCL directly affects (economically and socially) the entire
populous of California, its workers and businesses, the WCL qualifies as
affecting a "larger segment of society." Still, based on the results of the
experiment, is it likely that the WCL could or should diffuse to other states?
Diffusion is more likely to occur when a state's experiment is viewed as
adoption of the Borello test, Uber drivers were classified by the law as employees instead
of independent contractors).
264. Dodson, supra note 180, at 732.
265. Volden, supra note 1, at 294.
266. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1346-60 (discussing the three factors).
267. Shipan& Volden, supra note 178, at 842.
268. As of July 1, 2019, California is the most populous state with 39,512,223
residents. 2019 U.S. Population Estimates Continue to Show the Nation's Growth Is
Slowing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/2019/popest-nation.html. According to recent data, the ABC
Test, which represents the new part of California's worker classification law (AB5), "will
apply to [sixty-four] percent of workers who are independent contractors at their main
job, [and] will apply except when strict criteria are met to [twenty-seven] percent .... "
SARAH THOMASON, KEN JACOBS, & SHARON JAN., DATA BRIEF: ESTIMATING THE
COVERAGE OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW AB5 LAW 2 (2019).
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successful. In measuring success, the positive and negative results must be
weighed. Given that the WCL is a merger of the ABC test and California's
previous Borello test, and that it contains 109 carve-outs, it may be difficult
to discern precisely which parts of the WCL are successes and which are
failures. Case law and other political occurrences can also cause confusion
as to success versus failure. For instance, in the California courts, Uber
drivers were deemed employees under ABS in People v. Uber Technologies,
Inc.2 69 That is a significant success given the goal of protecting app-based
drivers via reclassification as employees. However, despite the ruling in
Uber, the passing of Prop 22 exempted the drivers from the coverage of the
WCL and provided the drivers with fewer benefits. Since the goal was to
provide safety net protections for the drivers and Prop 22 provides some of
these protections, even if marginally, there will likely be mixed reactions as
to the failure or success of this aspect of the WCL. In August 2021, a
California court found Prop 22 to be unconstitutional, 270 and if that holding
is upheld, then the WCL lends itself to being more of a success regarding
rideshare and delivery drivers since these workers were previously
reclassified as employees entitled to full California labor protections.
Ultimately the question becomes, how will the interaction between the WCL
and Prop 22 be perceived? 271 Will policymakers in states that do not have
broad voter initiative processes 272 like California see the WCL as a success
when it comes to reclassifying app-based drivers or will they see it as an
overall failure? Will policymakers in heterogenous states determine that the
marginal protections the rideshare companies offered their drivers were
sufficient and allow them to do so in their states? Only time will tell.
The above stated successes and failures will yield valuable information for
states that seek to "learn" from California's ABS experiment. Policymakers
will also be gaining important knowledge from both the public reactions as
well as any empirical evidence of what are perceived as the successes and
failures. Several industry groups rebuked using the ABC test to reclassify
their workers as employees. 273 California acquiesced and provided for carve269. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 266, 328 (Ct. App. 2020).
270. In August 2021, the Superior Court of California detennined that Prop 22 was
unconstitutional. What ultimately happens as the case makes it through the California
court system could impact policymakers' decision making. See supra note 144.
271. Ryan, supra note 259 (noting that in light of Prop. 22's passage, Uber and Lyft
have filed petitions to overturn earlier rulings which prevented them from classifying
their gig workers as independent contractors).
272. California's initiative process exists so that Californians do "not have to rely only
on lawmakers to make new laws. Propositions can create new laws, change or repeal
existing laws, change the state constitution, and approve a bond measure." EASY VOTER
GUIDE, FAST FACTS: STATE BALLOT MEASURES (2010), http://www.easyvoterguide.
org/wp-content/pdf/FastF acts-BallotMeasures. pdf.
273. See JON 0. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46765, WORKER
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outs in the WCL to accommodate these industries. However, hiring entities
in non-exempt industries could be motivated to hire independent contractors
from outside of California. States that cannot afford to have their workers
unemployed, may be reluctant to adopt an ABS-like statute. Additionally,
politicians seeking reelection will not want to be responsible for putting
workers in the unemployment line.
States seeking to learn from California's ABS experiment could adopt the
ABC test and customize it to fit their needs like California has been doing.2 74
Such states can learn from the pushback by certain industries when they
consider enacting similar legislation and decide whether to expand or take a
more restrictive approach.2 75
California's reputation of being larger and more "cosmopolitan" could
also influence states, who aspire to be like it. 276 Some states may feel an
urgency now that California has moved in the worker classification space
and that may promote diffusion. Or, policymakers may believe that the
controversies surrounding the WCL may die down and once all is quiet they
may decide it is safe to adopt. 277
Further, homogenous states may be more inclined to imitate or adopt the
WCL. Conversely, ideological and political bias that likely exists in
heterogeneous states may foreclose diffusion of the WCL to them.2 78 This
has possibly already proven true with recent changes in classification laws
that could be based on ideological or political bias. Certain heterogenous
states have abandoned the use of the ABC test in favor of another test
(Arkansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee) or voted to choose a test instead of the
ABC test (Virginia). Ideological and political bias aside, potential free-riders
may conclude that the WCL is not relevant to their state, the
information/results may be too difficult to obtain and verify as credible, and
that it will be too costly to adopt, implement, and enforce a statute like the
WCL. 279 Such states may determine that there must be a better way to
CLASSIFICATION: EMPLOYEE STATUS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AND THE ABC TEST (2021) (stating that because the
ABC test creates an employee-employer relationship that has not previously existed, the
test will discourage certain industries from hiring freelance or for contract workers).
274. See KARCH, supra note 152, at 149 ("Early adopters' experiences ... may
provide administrative lessons that also enable [free-riders] to develop [more] expansive
programs.").
275. Id. at 150 ("Early adopters' experiences might generate a political backlash that
limits the acceptability of an innovation, causing late adopters to take a more cautious
approach.").
276. See Shipan & Volden, supra note 178, at 843.
277. See KARCH, supra note 152, at 149.
278. Prince, supra note 35, at 161-63 (showing that certain politically conservative
states are abandoning the ABC test).
279. See KARCH, supra note 152, at 150.
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experiment or innovate on their own, while others may prefer the notoriety
that comes with innovation. In either case, diffusion is not likely to occur.
Overall, if the rate of diffusion is low, perhaps another state will be an
experimenter in this space by providing a better, more effective worker
classification test or approach. Even if the diffusion rate is somewhat high
(as it appears to be with the ABC test generally), one should question
whether the WCL or the ABC test is the best path forward for classifying
workers. When states free-ride, they rob us of the benefits of experimental
federalism - the more states that experiment and compare results, the more
optimal the resulting policy should be.2 80 This holds true particularly for
heterogenous states that analyze information differently and bring different
values, ideas, and foci to the process.2 81 Homogenous states and free-riding
in general result in sub-optimal policies because they do not bring different
values, ideas, and foci to the process. Instead, they create the problem of
premature convergence which can result in a broad adoption of a sub-optimal
test or policy.2 82 If states latch on to the WCL rather than experiment, we
miss out on a potentially better approach to worker classification. 283
V. CONCLUSION

California's worker classification law is developing. It is a true
experiment in that it started with a sort of "idea" (from Dynamex) and moved
into an experimental phase with the enactment of ABS. ABS was a merger
of new law (the ABC test) and old law (the Borello test). Upon receiving
industry and worker pushback, within a year ABS was repealed (or replaced)
with AB22S7, a law designed to clarify ABS's provisions. AB22S7 also
expanded the law's exemptions to 109. These changes show that the
experiment is still ongoing in that results are analyzed and California's
legislature acts on those results. Once the acting (or reacting) occurs, the
experiment starts again. As such, California's WCL is complicated and
continues to evolve, which can be a good thing and aligns with the
overarching theory of experimental federalism. But for the purposes of
diffusion among states, one may question whether it is adequately meeting
its goals.

280. Gewirtzman, supra note 148, at 258 ("[M]any of federalism's experimental
benefits are dependent upon states having different policy preferences and approaching
problems in materially different ways.").
281. Id. at 270.
282. Id. at 269-70.
283. Galle & Leahy, supra note 155, at 1368. Although, "[i]t is possible that instead
of experiments, states [will] all simply pluck what seem to them to be the lowest hanging
new fruits, rather than sorting among all of the available alternatives to select the most
appealing." Id.
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Many state policymakers look to California for innovative legislation that
they can adopt. Some states imitate other states when it comes to adopting
laws, but others prefer to learn from the results of the first-mover state's
experiment. As shown, state policymakers in numerous states like New
York, New Jersey, and Illinois (and likely others) are awaiting the ultimate
results of the ABS experiment. California's WCL may or may not diffuse to
other states depending on whether states determine it is relevant to their
residents, the information (results) are easy to obtain and credible, and the
costs to adopt, implement and enforce are feasible. In part because of the
numerous carve-outs in California's WCL, it is not likely that many states
will adopt it as is. The law is too customized to California and the 109 carveouts will likely be considered unmanageable. Measuring the successes and
failures is also difficult.
Overall, it appears that the ABS experiment should not diffuse to other
states or the federal government. The continued experimentation through
repeated amendments, while well-intentioned, has gone beyond providing an
adoptable statute for other states. To maximize the benefits of experimental
federalism, a group of states, both homogenous and heterogenous to
California, should experiment and work toward a more optimal solution to
worker (mis )classification. This collective learning will benefit not just one
state's residents and businesses, but all.
Workers need protections but California's worker classification law does
not sufficiently satisfy this need.
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APPENDIX A - LIST OF THE l 09 EXEMPTIONS FROM THE ABC TEST
PORTION OF CALIFORNIA'S WORKER CLASSIFICATION LAW: 284

[1] Bona fide business-to-business contracting relationship - previously
contained in AB 5
[2] Relationship between a referral agency and a service provider
[3] Graphic design [for referrals] - previously contained in AB 5
[4] Web design- previously contained in AB 5
[5] Photography - previously contained in AB 5
[6] Tutoring - previously contained in AB 5
[7] Consulting
[8] Youth sports coaching
[9] Caddying
[10] Wedding planning
[11] event planning - previously contained in AB 5
[12] Services provided by wedding and event vendors
[13] Minor home repair - previously contained in AB 5
[14] Moving - previously contained in AB 5
[15] Errands - previously contained in AB 5
[16] Furniture assembly - previously contained in AB 5
[17] Animal services - previously contained in AB 5
[18] Dog walking- previously contained in AB 5
[19] Dog grooming - previously contained in AB 5
[20] Picture hanging - previously contained in AB 5
[21] Pool cleaning - previously contained in AB 5
[22] Yard cleanup - previously contained in AB 5
[23] Interpreting services
[24] "Professional services"
[25] Marketing - previously contained in AB 5
[26] Administrator of human resources - previously contained in AB 5
[27] Travel agent services - previously contained in AB 5
[28] Graphic design - previously contained in AB 5
[29] Grant writer - previously contained in AB 5
[30] Fine artist - previously contained in AB 5
[31] Services provided by an emolled agent - previously contained
in AB 5
[32] Payment processing agent through an independent sales organization
- previously contained in AB 5
[33] Still photographer - previously contained in AB 5
[34] Photojournalist- previously contained in AB 5
[35] Videographer
284. Source: ABS, AB2257 & Chris Micheli, AB 5 'Fix: 'New Exemptions Added to
California's Independent Contractor Law,
CAL. GLOBE (Sept. 14, 2020),
https ://califomiaglobe .com/section-2/ab-5-fix-new-exemptions-added-to-californiasindependent-contractor-law /.
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[36] Photo editor who works under a written contract
[37] Digital content aggregator
[38] Freelance writer - previously contained in AB 5
[39] Translator
[40] Editor- previously contained in AB 5
[41] Copy editor
[42] Illustrator
[43] Newspaper cartoonist- previously contained in AB 5
[44] Content contributor
[45] Advisor
[46] Producer
[47] Narrator
[48] Cartographer
[49] Licensed esthetician - previously contained in AB 5
[50] Licensed electrologist- previously contained in AB 5
[51] Licensed manicurist - previously contained in AB 5
[52] Licensed barber- previously contained in AB 5
[53] Licensed cosmetologist- previously contained in AB 5
[54] A specialized performer
[55] Services provided by an appraiser
[56] Registered professional foresters
[57] A real estate licensee - previously contained in AB 5
[58] A home inspector
[59] A repossession agency - previously contained in AB 5
[60] Relationship between two individuals wherein each individual is
acting as a sole proprietor or separate business entity
[61] Recording artists
[62] Songwriters
[63] Lyricists
[64] Composers
[65] Proofers
[66] Managers of recording artists
[67] Record producers
[68] Directors
[69] Musical engineers
[70] Mixers engaged in the creation of sound recordings
[71] Musicians engaged in the creation of sound recordings
[72] Vocalists
[73] Photographers working on recording photo shoots, album covers,
and other press and publicity purposes
[74] Independent radio promoters
[75] Any other individual engaged to render any creative, production,
marketing
[76] Musician
[77] Musical group
[78] An individual performance artist performing material that is their
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original work and creative in character
[79] Relationship between a contractor and an individual performing
work pursuant to a subcontract in the construction industry - previously
contained in AB 5
[80] Relationship between a data aggregator and an individual providing
feedback
[81] A person or organization who is licensed by the Department of
Insurance pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1621) previously contained in AB 5
[82] A person or organization who is licensed by the Department of
Insurance pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1760) previously contained in AB 5
[83] A person or organization who is licensed by the Department of
Insurance pursuant to Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 1831) of Part
2 of Division 1 of the Insurance Code - previously contained in AB 5
[84] A person who provides underwriting inspections
[85] A person who provides premium audits
[86] A person who provides risk management
[87] A person who provides loss control work for the insurance and
financial service industries
[88] A physician and surgeon - previously contained in AB 5
[89] Dentist - previously contained in AB 5
[90] Podiatrist - previously contained in AB 5
[91] Psychologist - previously contained in AB 5
[92] Veterinarian- previously contained in AB 5
[93] Lawyer - previously contained in AB 5
[94] Architect- previously contained in AB 5
[95] Landscape architect
[96] Engineer - previously contained in AB 5
[97] Private investigator - previously contained in AB 5
[98] Accountant - previously contained in AB 5
[99] A securities broker-dealer - previously contained in AB 5
[100] Investment adviser- previously contained in AB 5
[101] Agents and representatives of securities brokers and investment
advisory - previously contained in AB 5
[102] A direct sales salesperson - previously contained in AB 5
[103] A manufactured housing salesperson
[104] A commercial fisher working on an American vessel - previously
contained in AB 5
[105] A newspaper distributor
[106] A newspaper carrier
[107] An individual who is engaged by an international exchange visitor
program
[108] A competition judge with a specialized skill set or expertise
[109] Relationship between a motor club holding a certificate of authority
- previously contained in AB 5

